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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION
Hiba Hafiz*
___ WIS. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2018)
In an era when administrative agency actions succeed or fail based
on the thoroughness and rigor of their cost-benefit analyses and expertise,
the 1940 statutory ban on hiring economists at the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) is a shocking anachronism. The ban,
accompanied by the Board’s failure to solicit external expertise, severely
limits the success of the Board’s actions on judicial review, its institutional
competency, and its ability to assess the economic effects of its labor
regulation in achieving a central goal of the National Labor Relations Act:
equal bargaining power between workers and their employers that secures
competitive wages and increases worker purchasing power.
This Article proposes the reestablishment of a Division of
Economic Research at the NLRB to integrate the study, analysis and
propagation of labor-related social science into the Board’s enforcement
and policy-making. In doing so, it draws on the history of the Board’s
short-lived Division of Economic Research (1935-1940) and on the
broader development and incorporation of economic and social scientific
expertise into the administrative state to consolidate best practices for a
new Division. Rejecting the development of expertise through interagency
working groups (IWGs) and Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) review as insufficient, the Article provides the first roadmap of its
kind on how a new internal ‘‘think tank’’ could integrate micro- and
macroeconomic analysis into the Board’s labor regulation. The work of a
new Division would not only develop and hone the Board’s ability to
achieve the Act’s goals through rulemaking and adjudication, but it would
also enhance the standing of the Board before the courts and the Board’s
ability to contribute to national debates on how to fight inequality and
reverse the dramatic decline of labor’s share of national income relative to
capital.

*

Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago.
The author is grateful for invaluable comments from William Baude, Adam Chilton,
Daniel Hemel, Aziz Huq, Jonathan Masur, Randall Picker, Michael Pollack, Laura
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INTRODUCTION
In 1935, when the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was passed
to protect and encourage workers to join collectively and lift themselves
out of the Depression, union density was at 16.6 percent. 1 Union density
1

Stanley Lebergott, The American Labor Force, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
220 (Lance Davis et al. eds., 1971)
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is now at 10.7 percent overall, and in the private sector regulated under
the NLRA, just 6.4 percent. 2 Then, as now, the likelihood of a broad,
coordinated and unified workers’ movement rising to combat
unprecedented inequality, pervasive corporate concentration, and
widespread precarious employment was uncertain. 3 But between 1935 and
1940, a small team of attorneys, economists and labor relations experts at
the constitutionally precarious National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
weathered Lochner-era persistent judicial dismantling of the New Deal,
mobilized Congressional enmity, potent corporate challenges, union infighting, a culture of red-baiting, and the fits and starts of a fractured
workers’ movement just beginning to understand its newfound rights to
not only defend the Board’s jurisdiction over hostile private employers but
do what was widely believed to be impossible: win Supreme Court
recognition of the NLRA’s constitutionality and begin institutionalizing
organizing and collective bargaining rights in private workplaces. 4
An underacknowledged secret weapon of that successful fight was the
Board’s now statutorily banned Division of Economic Research (DER). 5
And its abolition in 1940-----due to a combination of Congressional antilabor sentiment, red-baiting, employer resistance to the use of economic
data and internal betrayals---played no small part in the erosion of worker
protections as well as the delegitimizing of workers’ collective organizing
efforts and the NLRB’s expertise before the courts, political branches and
the public at large. This Article tells the story of how, in an age of the
dominance of cost-benefit analysis, the rise of administrative agency
expertise, and the innovative deployment of ‘‘big data’’ and behavioral
science, the definitive source of governmental labor regulation has
atrophied in the absence of robust economic and social scientific analysis.
Drawing from the history of the DER and administrative agency best
practices for incorporating social scientific work, it proposes a return to
integrating the study, analysis and propagation of labor-related social
science in the Board’s enforcement and policy-making. The work of a new
DER would not only develop and hone the Board’s ability to ensure a key
purpose of the NLRA-----equalizing bargaining power between labor and
2

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members --- 2016 (2017),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
3
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-F IRST CENTURY (2014);
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 20-53
(2002); JAMES GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 177
(1981); GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1974).
4
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5
See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a).
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capital-----in its rulemaking and adjudication, but it would also facilitate a
broader role for the Board in national debates about how to fight
inequality and reverse the dramatic decline of labor’s share of national
income.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the absence of economic
analysis at the Board, beginning with the short-lived but vigorous work of
the DER and the external and internal reasons for its demise. It then
details how, following the ban on hiring economists, the Board has failed
to solicit economic and social scientific expertise through rulemaking and
amicus curiae briefing in adjudication. Part I concludes with a discussion
of the adverse regulatory and institutional effects of the absence of Board
expertise on workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively.
While the Board has lagged behind, other agencies have dramatically
progressed in their integration of economic and social scientific analysis in
their regulatory functions. The rise of mandated cost-benefit analysis,
more aggressive judicial review and institutional knowledge have set the
stage for significantly advancing agency expertise. Part II discusses the
broader role of economic analysis in the administrative state, cataloguing
how agencies are moving beyond mere cost-benefit analysis, technical
litigation support, neoclassical economic presumptions, and applied
microeconomics to becoming ‘‘think tanks’’ for broader economic analysis
and policy-making, including utilizing advances in behavioral science,
‘‘big data’’ collection, and even macroeconomic modeling to assess
economy-wide impacts of regulation.
On this foundation, Part III considers three institutional mechanisms
for integrating economic analysis into labor regulation. It reviews the
advantages and disadvantages of forming an interagency working group,
or labor ‘‘superagency’’; coordinating review of NLRB rulemakings with
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); and developing
an internal DER at the Board, ultimately favoring the latter.
Part IV begins to imagine how the new DER could utilize
microeconomic analysis in a range of areas, beginning with enforcement
and policy-making, but extending more broadly into data collection and
analysis as well as research projects that could reset the Board’s priorities
in adjudication and rulemaking. Taking the Board’s failed Notice Posting
Rule requiring employers’ posting of employees’ NLRA rights in the
workplace, it imagines how the Rule could have been successfully guided
through the rulemaking process and judicial review with the help of
economic and social scientific evidence.
Extending the discussion from microeconomic to macroeconomic
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analysis, Part V begins by highlighting the macroeconomic effects of labor
regulation on labor’s share of national income, rising inequality, and
enhancing worker output. After considering these effects, it outlines
research opportunities for a new DER that could resituate the Board in its
crucial role as an agency working to enhance workers’ purchasing power
and productivity. Part V concludes with a case study exploring how a new
DER could dramatically impact current doctrine in ‘‘independent
contractor’’ misclassification cases. Specifically, it discusses how the new
Division could gather and analyze data to forecast the economy-wide
effects of narrower and broader interpretations of the ‘‘independent
contractor’’ classification, which places millions of workers outside of the
NLRA’s protections and the Board’s jurisdiction. It thus aims to
demonstrate how harnessing the benefits of advances in social scientific
tools and analysis would not only enhance the NLRB’s expertise and
legitimacy, but could allow it to reshape the national debate on the
importance of workers’ collective rights as a socio-economic matter.
I. ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT THE NLRB
The NLRB is the only administrative agency to which Congress has
expressly banned the ‘‘appoint[ment of] individuals for . . . economic
analysis.’’6 In an age where failing to engage in robust cost-benefit
analysis can be the death knell of even independent agency rulemaking, 7
the Congressional ban is at best an anomaly. But the performance of
economic analysis was not always prohibited at the Board. In fact, the
work of the Board’s short-lived Division of Economic Research (DER)
(1935-1940) was critical to the Board’s early litigation strategy and the
Supreme Court’s determination of the NLRA’s constitutionality. In this
Section, I discuss the context and bases for the Congressional ban as well
as the Board’s subsequent failure to solicit economic expertise through
engaging in rulemakings or incorporating the expertise of amici curiae in
adjudications. I then assess the institutional and regulatory effects of the
6

29 U.S.C. § 154(a).
See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(striking down SEC proxy access rule for failing to sufficiently address its impacts on
‘‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation’’ in a cost-benefit analysis); Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (‘‘The [EPA] must consider cost-----including, most
importantly, cost of compliance-----before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and
necessary.’’); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking
down EPA asbestos regulation for failing to demonstrate it was the least burdensome
means of regulating health hazards in a cost-benefit analysis).
7
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Board’s absence of economic expertise on labor regulation.
A. Ban on Economic Analysis
The NLRB’s Division of Economic Research was established in the
shadow of the Supreme Court’s assault on New Deal legislation, and more
specifically, its Schechter Poultry decision invalidating, on commerce
clause and other grounds, a provision of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) that authorized Executive approval of ‘‘codes of fair
competition’’ for the poultry and other industries. 8 Edwin S. Smith, a
member of the newly-founded Board, advised its first Chairman, J.
Warren Madden, that the Board needed ‘‘an ‘industrial economist’
thoroughly versed in the history of labor relations in various industries in
this country’’ to furnish the Board with ‘‘material adequately[,] both in
writing and as a witness,’’ on the connection between collective bargaining
failures and unlawful union-busting campaigns on the one hand and strikes
as disruptions of interstate commerce on the other. 9
In advertising for the Division’s Chief Economist, the Board had high
standards, requiring
a minimum eight years of responsible, successful
experience of a highly technical nature in economic
research, or in college teaching of economics, or in a
combination of such research and teaching. This experience
must have included at least four years of experience in
research in labor economics or in college teaching in the
field of labor economics, or in a combination of such
research and teaching; and, in addition, must have included
at least one year of supervision either of a corps of research
economists or of a college or university department of
economics. The experience and writings of the applicants
must clearly demonstrate outstanding attainment in the field
of labor economics and ability to perform the abovementioned duties. 10
8

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
James Gross, Economics, Politics, and the Law: The NLRB’s Division of Economic
Research, 1935-1940, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 323 (1970) (citing NLRB files,
Memorandum from Edwin S. Smith to J. Warren Madden, Industrial Economist, Aug.
31, 1935)). For the Board’s constitutional strategy, see GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE
NLRB, supra note 3, at 173-88.
10
Letter from David J. Saposs to Reps. Murdock and Healey, Apr. 17, 1940, ACLU
9
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The degree of expertise that the Board sought was a clear indication of the
import of the Chief Economist’s role in the new Board, but the details of
that role were vague from the start. When David J. Saposs, the first and
only Chief Economist in the Division, was recommended to the position
by Harry A. Millis (a member of the pre-Wagner National Labor Board)
and Francis Biddle (the pre-Wagner Board’s Chairman), then-Chairman
Madden told Saposs he ‘‘ha[d]n’t the slightest idea what you can do in the
Board or for the Board’’ to derive a plan of economic research adequate to
the daunting task assigned. 11
Organizationally, the Division at its founding had equal status with the
Legal Division, the Trial Examining Division, and the Division of
Publications. 12 Saposs, a labor economist trained at the University of
Wisconsin in the institutional economics school as John R. Commons’
student and co-author, 13 had no shortage of work or ideas. While Saposs
selected diverse staff with a wide range of backgrounds-----labor
economists, social workers, political scientists, historians, journalists,
monetary theorists-----their central focus was the study of the ‘‘actual
experience’’ of labor relations in the United States. 14 Throughout his
tenure, Saposs would invite industry experts from labor journalists to
government administrators and the Reuther Brothers to give the staff
‘‘advice into their research, organization, mediation, or whatever else was
of current concern[,] this wide-ranging group representing all political
hues.’’15 He would also hold ‘‘staff seminars’’ to bring in the newest
research or labor story of the day as examples to engage ‘‘pedagogicaladministrative devices . . . to embark upon new studies. ’’16 For example,
he would alert the staff: ‘‘I read in the paper this morning that a company
has bargained with the union, but has simply refused to put the agreement
in writing. Is this a refusal to bargain in good faith? What does ‘good

Archives.
11
Gross, supra note 9, at 323 & n.12 (quoting Oral History Interview with David J.
Saposs, July 22, 1968, at 5, Labor Management Documentation Center, Cornell
University).
12
Id. at 324 & n.16 (quoting Saposs Interview, supra note 11, at 11).
13
See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
(1918).
14
Morris Weisz, Research as a Tool of Administration: The Contribution of David J.
Saposs, in THE LABOR MOVEMENT: A RE-EXAMINATION 102 (Jack Barbash ed., 1967).
15
Id. at 104.
16
Id. at 102.
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faith’ mean? We’ll have to study this.’’17
And study it they would. The work of the Division took on many
forms. Primarily, the Division: (1) provided litigation support to Board
enforcement actions; and (2) drafted general studies on labor relations
problems as guidance for Board policy. 18 In terms of litigation support, the
Division: assisted in drafting complaints by investigating the Board’s
jurisdiction over employers based on corporate organization and assets as
well as the level of their interstate operations; collected economic
materials as evidence in litigation from economic sources on industrial
organization and labor economics as well as government reports; and
provided detailed economic review of those employers’ written
agreements, employment records, labor policies and activities, history
with labor disputes and the existence vel non of company rather than
independent unions. For this, Saposs drew on his extensive labor
economics research with Commons as well as on his prior work in a
‘‘think tank’’ he had founded with leading labor economists-----the ‘‘Labor
Bureau, Inc.’’-----that researched and prepared economic data for union use
in collective bargaining. 19
In terms of policy guidance, the Division prepared research
memoranda, research outlines, and printed bulletins for the Board’s use in
future cases, general policy planning, and public consumption. 20 These
studies were initiated by the Division or evolved from individual cases for
broader industry-wide or economy-wide studies. These included studies on
‘‘Effective Collective Bargaining,’’ ‘‘Employer Labor Policies and
Activities,’’ ‘‘The Structure of AFL Unions,’’ ‘‘The Role of Supervisory
Employees in Spreading Employer Views,’’ ‘‘Governmental Protection of
Labor’s Right to Organize,’’ and in a classic example, ‘‘Written Trade
Agreements in Collective Bargaining,’’ which expanded the economic
materials prepared for the Board’s Inland Steel case evaluating whether
written rather than informal trade agreements were integral to collective
bargaining and labor peace. 21 The Division also investigated the broader
history of collective bargaining failures by industry, company interference
and domination of unions, businesses’ profits and losses to determine the
good or bad faith of employers in refusing to entertain employees’ wage
17

Id.
Gross, supra note 9, at 324-25.
19
E.L. Oliver, The Economist and the Labor Union-----Then and Now, in THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, supra note 14, at 114-15.
20
Gross, supra note 9, at 326.
21
Id. at 326; GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 177; Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1940).
18

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION

9

demands, and even the effect on collective bargaining of the presence of
members of the public in collective bargaining conference rooms. 22
In this work, Saposs ‘‘supplied the economic groundwork for the
division’s thinking’’ as well as the foundational economic materials for
cases working their way through to ultimate constitutional challenge at the
Supreme Court, serving as a testifying expert in the Board’s leading
cases. 23 Economic data had been successfully used by employers in early
antitrust labor boycott cases, 24 but with the influence of the ‘‘Brandeis
technique,’’ were being deployed by Progressives, most iconically in
Muller v. Oregon and other minimum wage and maximum hour cases. 25 In
the NLRA cases, the Board dramatically centralized its authority,
developed a rigorous litigation strategy, vetted cases for inevitable
Supreme Court review, and set the Division on the task of fortifying the
congressional findings in section 1 of the NLRA: ‘‘that employer unfair
labor practices lead to strikes and industrial unrest, which physically
obstruct the flow of commerce.’’26
In September 1935, the Board prepared an outline that detailed the
necessary economic data for its litigation strategy on the commerce clause
issue, demanding for each leading case information about: the employer
respondent’s business and industry, its relative size, products produced,
capital invested, sources of raw materials and manufactured parts, markets
for finished products, the amount and value of production and advertising
across state lines, and the use of products of other businesses and
industries in interstate commerce. 27 The data collection did not end there
because the Division also had to empirically justify the purported causal
relationship between employer unfair labor practices and strikes. For this
information, economists were to dig into the history of company and
industry strikes or strike threats as well as the effects of those strikes on
interstate commerce. 28 For a more substantial foundation, the Division was

22

David Ziskind, The Use of Economic Data in Labor Cases, 6 U. CHI. L. REV.
607, 631 (1939).
23
Weisz, supra note 14, at 105; Gross, supra note 9, at 325.
24
See Ziskind, supra note 22, at 611-12.
25
For the impact of the ‘‘Brandeis technique’’ on Saposs, see Gross, supra note 9, at
324. For fuller discussion of the ‘‘Brandeis brief,’’ see, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 188-89, 209-10 (1992).
26
GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 158-59, 179-88.
27
Id. at 182 (citing NLRB files, ‘‘The Relevance and Importance of the
Congressional Findings Contained in the National Labor Relations Act, ’’ Memorandum
by Stanley S. Surrey, Sept. 30, 1935, at 3-5, 25-27).
28
Id. at 183.
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to investigate labor relations broadly to determine the causes of strikes in
general, the effects of the removal of unfair labor practices on workers’
propensity to strike, and the advantages of NLRA tools like collective
bargaining on that propensity. 29
The development and deployment of the rich economic data collected,
produced and analyzed by the Division was an unequivocal success for the
Board’s drive towards both legitimation and recognition of the
constitutionality of the NLRA. Whereas labor advocates in pre-Board
cases, from the ‘‘yellow dog’’ contract cases of Adair v. United States and
others30 to the early secondary boycott cases, neither made an effort to
deploy economic data nor succeeded in challenging Lochner-era
legislation, 31 the Board carefully and successfully secured amenable
review by the Supreme Court through use of economic data, economic
expert reports, and expert testimony. 32
Favorable review of cases featuring the Division’s supporting evidence
of interstate commerce and the effects of the NLRA’s collective
bargaining provisions culminated in the Court upholding the NLRA’s
constitutionality in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 33 In its
momentous decision, the Court not only reviewed the Division’s data and
expert testimony by Saposs and others-----made available through transcripts
of the Board’s hearings, official Board bulletins, and in Board attorneys’
briefs and oral arguments-----but explicitly cited them to support its finding
that ‘‘[r]efusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife.’’34 Not only did the majority opinion reference instances
of such resulting strife, it listed in a footnote several reports supplied by
the Division and the Board’s bulletin, and even alluded to the train of
evidence submitted in prior cases by recognizing that strikes caused by
employer refusals to bargain were ‘‘such an outstanding fact in the history
of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and
requires no citation of instances.’’35
The day after the Jones & Laughlin decision came down, the
29

Id.
See generally Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
and accompanying party briefs.
31
Ziskind, supra note 22, at 608-12, 615-17, 623.
32
Id. at 624-31.
33
Id.; 301 U.S. 1.
34
301 U.S. at 42; Ziskind, supra note 22, at 624; GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB,
supra note 3, at 191-92.
35
301 U.S. at 42-43 & n.8.
30
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atmosphere at the Board was ‘‘just wild,’’ ‘‘like a carnival.’’36 But Saposs
was hard at work preparing proposals for the Division’s broader role at
the Board, presenting those proposals to the Board’s Chairman, Members
and General Counsel just one week after the Supreme Court decision. 37
Specifically, Saposs sought to have: the Board’s jurisdiction determined in
the field ‘‘by a member of the staff trained in economics, working in
cooperation with the regional attorney’’; an economist proficient in labor
relations to ‘‘assist, not only in the preparation of evidence prior to the
hearing, but also at the hearing,’’ in ‘‘importance cases’’; close
cooperation between the Division and reviewing attorneys handling the
case after Board hearings; data prepared of all major industries; the
publication of educational materials on appropriate labor relations issues
‘‘for the public, employers, workers, and legislators’’; and the
establishment of a reading course ‘‘for all our staff,’’ supplemented by
lectures, ‘‘in the history and practices of labor relations.’’38
But for a number of external and internal reasons, Saposs’ ambitious
goals for the Division would not only go unfulfilled, but the Division itself
would be stripped of its funding and, in a little noticed Congressional
measure, banned from resurfacing by the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the
NLRA.
To begin: the external reasons for the Division’s banishment. The
Division’s work propelled the success of an agency that was widely
believed to be destined for extinction after Schechter Poultry. When the
ability of the NLRB to intervene in private employment relationships
survived constitutional scrutiny, both the NLRB and the Division moved
more deeply into the maelstrom of shifting politics after the 1938 elections
and larger political debates about the administrative state as a target of
Congressional circumscription. Two years after Jones & Laughlin, the
House Labor Committee opened hearings on amendments to the NLRA
after an arch-conservative Virginia Congressman, Howard Smith,
submitted a House resolution to establish a special committee to
investigate, take testimony, and report on the NLRB’s administration of
the NLRA and recommend to Congress desirable changes to the Act and

36

GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 231 (quoting Charles Fahy, Oral
History Interview, July 23, 1968, at 32; Herbert Glaser, Oral History Interview, Mar.
18, 1969, at 28).
37
Id. at 235.
38
Id. (quoting NLRB Files, ‘‘Suggested Plan of Activities for the Division of
Economic Research,’’ Memorandum from D.J. Saposs to J.W. Madden, E.S. Smith,
D.W. Smith, C. Fahy, R. Watts, N. Witt, B. Wolf, P. Levy, Apr. 19, 1937, at 1-3).
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the NLRB’s personnel. 39 The House Special Committee to Investigate the
National Labor Relations Board, or the ‘‘Smith Committee,’’ was stacked
with three Republicans and Southern Democrats on one side and two New
Dealers (Arthur Healey from Massachusetts and Abe Murdock of Utah)
on the other. 40 The Committee began their investigation in December 1939
and continued hearings through the submission of a Final Report in
December 1941. 41
Two key lines of attack emerged in the Smith Committee
investigations that doomed the Division. First, concerns about the power
of agencies in the new administrative state concentrated on the role of the
Division in developing expertise and introducing evidence in Board and
court adjudication. In its Intermediate Report, produced to gain support
for Smith’s own bill to amend the NLRA to, among other things, abolish
the Division, the Committee majority contended that the NLRB
improperly combined its functions by basing decisions on economic
material it produced in-house by the Division, acting ‘‘as prosecutor,
judge, and jury’’ in how it
conducts the investigation, initiates the complaint, hears the
evidence upon the complaint, and then renders its decision.
The coexistence of these functions in the same body makes
it possible for this administrative agency to overlook the
separation requirement that is so deeply ingrained in our
political pattern. 42
Employer respondents shared these as dominant complaints of the Board
and the Division, both in court and in Congressional testimony. 43
While many New Deal agencies mixed prosecutorial and judicial
functions, and charges that the Board failed to enter its economic evidence

39

GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 103-106.
Id. at 151-54.
41
Id. at 157-59.
42
See U.S. House of Rep., Intermediate Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate the NLRB, Report No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1940) (hereafter Intermediate Report), 45, 89-90; Robin Stryker, Limits on
Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor Relations Board’s
Division of Economic Research, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 341, 350-51 (1989).
43
Intermediate Report, supra note 42, at 89; U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the
Committee on Education and Labor on National Labor Relations Act and Proposed
Amendments, Vol. 10, 76th Cong., 1st-3rd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1939-40),
1927-57; Stryker, supra note 42, at 349.
40
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into the case record were unfounded, the NLRB became an easy nexus of
convergence for political anxieties about the administrative state. 44 Board
employees, and Saposs in particular, came under virulent attack for
purportedly harboring Communist views. The Committee, familiar with
the Division’s importance in winning Board cases, claimed that Saposs,
who was ‘‘born in Russia,’’ had ‘‘radical views,’’ advocated the
‘‘destruction of the capitalistic system in this country,’’ was a member of
the Socialist Party as a student at the University of Wisconsin, and
brought a ‘‘strangely exaggerated social consciousness . . . . to his
work.’’45 In its Final Report, the Committee complained that NLRB
personnel ‘‘holding to alien tenets which stress class warfare as a means of
abolishing the free system of private enterprise cannot . . . be fair and
impartial quasi-judicial officers in the administration of the National Labor
Relations Act’’ and contribute ‘‘to a condition of intensified class
feeling.’’46
While the attacks on Saposs mirrored a broader culture of red-baiting,
they were ironically enough directed at a fervent anti-Communist and
were in part aided by claims from within the Board by those who viewed
Saposs’ institutionalist views as too conservative. 47 In fact, Saposs served
as an alarmist within the Board about ‘‘Communist infiltration.’’48 But
Saposs’ attempt to ‘‘out’’ the Communists at the Board during the Smith
Committee hearings dramatically backfired: he sought out and met with
minority members Murdock and Healey as a way to defend himself and
the Division by identifying the ‘‘real’’ Communists at the Board, but this
appeared only to confirm their infiltration of the agency, and given that
the political momentum had so drastically swung against him and the
Division, made him the easiest scapegoat. 49 For liberals and New Dealers
looking to more broadly save the NLRA from the Smith Bill amendments
or worse, silencing the whistleblower and giving the conservatives the
Division shut-down they were universally behind killed two birds with one
stone.
See DANIEL ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 97-99 (2014); Jeremy Kessler, The Struggle for
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 752 (2016); Gross, supra note 9, at
342-43.
45
86 CONG. REC. 7560 (1940); see also Stryker, supra note 42, at 350-51.
46
U.S. House of Rep., Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate the
NLRB, Report No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1941), 5.
47
Gross, supra note 9, at 340-41.
48
GROSS, RESHAPING THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 89, 131-50.
49
Id. 214-16, 219-20.
44
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The Division was not aided by an institutional tension within the Board
between lawyers on the one hand and economists and social scientists on
the other. As a cultural matter, the lawyers viewed the economists as a
dime a dozen, Chairman Madden describing them as technocrats
performing work that ‘‘any kind of individual’’ with ‘‘a certain type of
education . . . can do.’’50 Charles Fahy, the Board’s General Counsel,
believed the economists’ work in presenting economic data to the Supreme
Court, while ‘‘prudent, wise, and helpful,’’ was not as important as they
thought it was and ought ultimately be subservient to the legal work. 51
Saposs nevertheless persisted, insisting on the DER’s significance in
Board reports and bulletins, citing the economic and sociological basis of
the NLRA and foretelling a ‘‘trend toward enlightenment’’ where ‘‘the
public consciousness is being focused on the economic factors inherent in
the problems confronting the Board.’’52 When Saposs described the
Board’s Supreme Court victories, he characterized them as ‘‘affirm[ing]
the appropriateness of the ‘economic approach’ for which the Brandeis
brief was the precedent’’ in making ‘‘full use of the economic evidence
presented in each case, coupled with the complete disregard for finely
spun legal distinctions.’’53 But when Saposs presented his proposals for the
future work of the Division after the Jones & Laughlin decision, Fahy’s
Office rejected them, directing all regional attorneys to interface with the
Board exclusively through his office and ordering the elimination of ‘‘all
economic material except that which is necessary to prove the operations
of the particular respondent.’’54 Fahy suggested the use of economic data
in appellate briefing in ‘‘borderline cases’’ and opposed establishing any
general rules for incorporating economic data in adjudication, perhaps
because he viewed the interstate commerce clause issue to have been
resolved. 55 The Board sustained Fahy’s recommendations. 56
The edifice began crumbling around the Division in June 1940, when
50

GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 175 (quoting U.S. Congress,
Senate, Hearings on H.R. 10539 Before the Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940), 578).
51
Id. at 234 (quoting Oral History Interview with Charles Fahy, supra note 36, at
28, 30-31)).
52
Id. at 234-35 (quoting NLRB, Second Annual Report, at 46).
53
Id. at 235 (quoting NLRB, Second Annual Report, at 47).
54
Id. at 236 (quoting NLRB Files, ‘‘Economic Material as Evidence in Hearings, ’’
Memorandum from C. Fahy to D.J. Saposs, May 13, 1937, at 1).
55
Id.
56
Id. (citing NLRB Files, ‘‘Jurisdictional Proof and Cooperation Between Legal Staff
and Economic Division,’’ Memorandum from C. Fahy to Regional Attorneys and
Attorneys in Regional Offices, Sept. 22, 1937).

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION

15

the House Appropriations Committee, following the Smith Committee’s
recommendations, severely cut the Division’s appropriation. 57 In an
attempt to salvage what was left of the Division, Madden retained Saposs
but renamed the DER the ‘‘Technical Service Division,’’ limiting it to the
technical work of calculating back-pay awards in discrimination cases and
gathering case statistics. 58 The House Appropriations Committee saw
through the ruse and eliminated the Division altogether in October 1940,
through provisions of Public Law No. 812. 59 Section 4(a) of the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, with a thin legislative history,
officially codified the ban in the statute itself: ‘‘Nothing in this Act shall
be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose
of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis.’’60 In protesting the
provision, New Dealer Senator Harley Kilgore (D-WV), who helped
establish the National Science Foundation in 1950, expressed his concerns
in complaining that economic experts were:
[N]ecessary to study industrial relations, to study company
statistical records, . . . to provide the necessary advice for
the Board to determine what is and what is not fair in the
way of wages. But they are forbidden to hire such men.
Whom are they going to get? Will the Board proceed
along the line of intelligent guesses we hear so much
about? How a Government agency concerned week in and
week out with problems arising out of economic
conditions can function with the help of economists is a
question I cannot answer. I would as soon operate a mine
without a mining-engineer as to try to establish a wage
scale without an economic staff who can study the
economics of the situation. 61
57

Gross, supra note 9, at 341.
Id.
59
Act of October 9, 1940, ch. 780, 54 Stat. 1037 (‘‘After the date of the enactment
of this Act, none of the appropriation, ‘Salaries, National Labor Relations Board, 1941,’
shall be obligated for the Division of Economic Research or for the Division of Technical
Service.’’).
60
29 U.S.C. 154(a). The Senate Report for the Amendment indicates that the words
‘‘or for economic analysis’’ were substituted for a narrower ‘‘(or for statistical work,
where such service may be obtained from the Department of Labor). ’’ The new language
was added in conference, but the conference report itself does not refer to it. See H.R.
REP. NO. 510, at 37-38 (1947) (Conf. Rep.).
61
93 CONG. REC. 7418 (1947). For Kilgore’s involvement in the foundation of the
NSF, see DANIEL LEE KLEINMAN, POLITICS ON THE ENDLESS F RONTIER 75-99 (1995).
58
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In response, Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) justified the provision on
procedural grounds: without it, the Board could ‘‘go outside the record,
build up its own record unbeknown to the union or the company, and
make a decision based on what it may find from the opinion of its own
economists outside the record.’’62 Thus, while the Senate’s debate
highlighted at least one Senator’s concern about the implications of the
provision, the legacy of the Smith Committee persisted in justifying the
ban.
B. Failure to Solicit Economic Analysis
Agencies have since leapt forward in gaining economic expertise to
engage in cost-benefit and even broader economic and social scientific
analysis in rulemaking and policy-setting following Presidential Executive
Orders, statutory amendments to agencies’ organic statutes, and evolving
judicial requirements. 63 But despite this overwhelming revolution in
agency practice and structure, the NLRB’s DER has never been revived,
leaving the Board a ‘‘historical anachronism,’’ ‘‘the only administrative
agency forbidden to seek such economic information on its own.’’64
But the Board has also failed to elicit economic analysis through
notice-and-comment rulemaking or through soliciting and incorporating
expertise from amici curiae in adjudications. 65 To begin, despite
overwhelming criticism, the Board has only successfully engaged in two
substantive rulemakings, one on bargaining unit determinations in the
62

93 CONG. REC. 7419 (1947).
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C. F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R.
215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-02; Exec. Order No.
13,579 § 1(b)---(c), 3 C.F.R. 256, 257 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 102. The literature on the rise of cost-benefit analysis in agency regulation is
immense, but the following is a sampling. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
STATE (2002); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics
to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in
the Twenty-First Century, N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003).
64
GROSS, RESHAPING THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 264-65
65
See generally Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking:
Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1469 (2015); Catherine Fisk & Deborah
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and
Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 101 (2009); Samuel Estreicher,
Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163
(1985).
63
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health care industry and the other on streamlining union representation
elections. 66 For context, other agencies collectively publish 2,500 to 4,500
final rules a year (1,350 ‘‘major’’ rules between 1997 and 2015 alone). 67
In defending itself, the Board has focused on the benefits of
adjudication in allowing it to develop policy in relation to actual cases,
arguing that ‘‘[b]road public participation would necessarily involve delay
and diffusion of issues in disposition of specific cases, contrary to sound
judicial practice and the special need for speedy resolution of labor
disputes brought to the Board for determination.’’68 But the Board’s
defenses do not address how its choice to engage in adjudication rather
than rulemaking affects its economic expertise. 69 In fact, while the Board
has solicited amicus briefs in high-profile cases, it is non-mandatory, rare,
and case-specific. 70 When it has occurred, and the Board has incorporated
the arguments and analyses of amici, it has rarely resulted in the Board
modifying or more fully engaging in the economic implications of any
given adjudication. 71
In sum, where the Board lacks the internal capacity to develop
economic expertise under the statutory ban, it does not make up for it by
soliciting such expertise through its agency actions. Its failure to engage in

66

See id.; Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. §
103.30 (1991); Representation --- Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101-103). The Fifth Circuit and D.C. District Court
recently upheld the representation election rule. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Tex. v.
NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 218 (2016); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp.
3d 171, 177 (D.D.C. 2015).
67
Gov’t Accountability Office, Fed. Rules, http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressionalreview-act/overview#fedRulesForm; MAEVE P. CAREY, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF F EDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE
F EDERAL REGISTER 1 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2016).
68
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY AND
STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN THE
F EDERAL AGENCIES-----AGENCY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 1811 (Comm. Print 1957).
See also 46 LAB. REL. REP. 343 (1960); 46 A.B.A.J. 455 (1960); 45 LAB. REL. REP.
407, 409 (1959).
69
See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 65, at 2016 & n. 12 (collecting sources).
70
See Archived Notices for Briefs and Invitations, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/casesdecisions/invitations-file-briefs/archived-notices-briefs-and-invitations (last visited July
19, 2017).
71
See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 2014 NLRB
LEXIS 964, at *4-6, 19 (Dec. 15, 2014) (providing limited review of amici arguments on
Board’s standard for deferring to arbitral decisions); Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B.
No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011) (same on Board’s rule barring election petitions for a reasonable
period after voluntary recognition of a union by a majority of employees).
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economic analysis has serious regulatory and institutional effects.
C. Institutional and Regulatory Effects of Absence of Economic Analysis
1. Regulatory Effects
The Board’s lack of expertise first and foremost has meant a lack of
expert supervision and utilization of pertinent social scientific and
industrial relations developments in fulfilling a key purpose of the NLRA:
increasing worker bargaining power to lift competitive wage rates and
mass purchasing power. 72 The termination of the DER has also meant that
the Board’s regulatory role in shaping national discourse on unionization
has floundered, from rulemaking to adjudication and beyond: setting
policy and Board priorities; providing solid guidance through informed
research to both the public and private sectors on the importance of
protecting workers’ right to organize and collectively bargain; and
collecting and maintaining institutionalized data from its own
investigations and the Board’s adjudications for future Board use as well
as for social scientific and policy research.
Further, the Board’s recent experience with rulemaking and
adjudication on key issues, ranging from mandatory notice posting to
‘‘independent contractor’’ misclassification, suggests its vulnerability to
judicial invalidation. 73 The Board’s decades-long failure to engage in
rulemaking also has dramatic effects on its ability to regulate labor in
accordance with advances in economic theory and broader social scientific
developments on labor relations. 74 Rulemaking provides a convenient site
72

29 U.S.C. § 151; GROSS, RESHAPING THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 265. For a
summary of the literature on the NLRA’s competing purposes, and the subordination of
the micro- and macroeconomic goals of the Act to the achievement of ‘‘labor peace,’’ see
Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. ___, ___ & n.43
(forthcoming 2018).
73
See, e.g., Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) (requiring employers to post a notice of
employee rights); Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013)
(striking down the rule); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. V. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(same); Employee Rights Notice Posting, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/poster
(withdrawing notice rule); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (overturning Board determination of FedEx drivers as ‘‘employees’’ rather than
‘‘independent contractors’’).
74
See, e.g., Myron Roomkin & Roger I. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in
NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1442, 1445-47 (1977) (arguing
for rulemaking to incorporate developments in behavioral science and human relations
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for the convergence of expert opinion on the economic impacts of
proposed rules and policy changes that would aid in developing the
Board’s expertise and help to ensure predictable, ex ante policymaking
grounded in industry- and economy-wide workplace realities. 75
Rulemaking would allow solicitation of greater public information
aimed at a broader range of situations than any particular adjudication,
and on matters that the Board is charged with regulating, it is much easier
for it to conduct data collection than the courts. 76 In its first rulemaking,
the Board accumulated a vast amount of empirical data ‘‘that simply had
not been available to it in adjudications.’’77 Not only does the Board
collect more data through rulemaking than adjudication, but it is required
to incorporate and respond to that information substantively to better
survive ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ review. Ex ante engagement with
outside sources would facilitate centralized policy-setting as compared to
ad hoc policy-making based on cases pursued by Board regional directors,
and it would provide regulated parties clarity and consistency for planning
purposes, especially in light of the Board’s frequent policy reversals
through adjudication. 78
The Board’s failure to embrace economic analysis enhances the

that illuminate employer-employee conduct and interactions).
75
See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4046 (1938)
(providing classic justification for agency policymaking through inclusive procedure,
reliance on experts and empirical evidence, and political accountability); Estreicher,
supra note 65, at 172-173, 176; Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 403 (1972) (arguing that public participation improves
the administrative process by identifying interests deserving of protection, producing
relevant evidence and arguments for appropriate action, and closing the gap between
agencies and their constituents). However, administrative law scholars have also drawn
attention to the potential for agency capture and information costs in rulemaking. See,
e.g., Miriam Seifter, Second Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 1300, 1306, 1325-27 (2016) (highlighting how interest group participation in
rulemaking can distort agency agendas and frustrate enhancement of agency expertise);
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325, 1380 (2010) (describing parties’ ‘‘information capture’’ of the
regulatory process). Institutional design solutions can encourage expertise-enhancing
rulemaking. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426 (2011).
76
Garden, supra note 65, at 1475, 1486; Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First
Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 320 (1991)
77
Grunewald, supra note 76, at 320.
78
Garden, supra note 65, at 1476, 1489; Estreicher, supra note 65, at 173;
Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s Performance in
Policy Formulation: Adjudication & Rule-making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 270 (1968).
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already-existing structural obstacles it faces in making coherent labor
policy, placing it in a kind of ‘‘administrative law exile.’’79 As
commentators have noted, those structural obstacles include:
[T]he exclusion of social scientists from is policymaking
staff and social science-based reasoning from its decisions,
its isolation from labor policymaking activities and data
analysis at the Department of Labor, and the tendency of
Board members, who recently have been drawn almost
entirely from the ranks of labor and management
attorneys, to reason like lawyers balancing rights rather
than policy analysts studying social and economic
regulatory problems. 80
These obstacles prevent the Board from discerning whether its policies
accord with the NLRA’s goals and broader policy-setting within the
administrative state concerning labor and employment. Such capacity is
necessary to ‘‘quantify the effects of labor law on the constituencies of
labor policy (or indeed to identify those constituencies).’’81 Where other
agencies are expected to improve based on their social scientific
expertise, the Board lacks the capacity to even determine if its remedies
produce their desired regulatory effects. For example, one of the Board’s
most aggressive remedies-----reinstatement of employees discharged
because of union activity-----has not been subjected to thorough empirical
investigation to evaluate whether or not it is effective after over seventyfive years. 82
The Board’s impotence in appraising the success of its remedies is just
one area that its limited capacity forsakes workers. Without supporting
economic data and analysis in the records of underlying regional
enforcement actions, and without an internal Division supervising
enforcement at its various stages to ensure a developed record, the Board
and the courts are unbound in their reasoning even as they pervasively
base that reasoning, in case after case, on unverified and unsubstantiated
economic grounds. In addition to the remedies example just discussed, the

79

See generally Fisk & Malamud, supra note 65, at 2044-57; see also James J.
Brudney, Isolated & Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 221, 235 (2005).
80
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 65, at 2019.
81
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 65, at 2055.
82
GROSS, RESHAPING THE NLRB, supra note 3, at 266.
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following are just a sampling of the many areas of labor law doctrine that
have radically shaped the landscape of worker protections without a social
scientific basis. In each of these examples, the Board and the courts have
failed to either ground their opinions in economic evidence or have failed
to consider how their line-drawing has adverse economic effects on the
relative bargaining power of employees and employers that, as a result,
impact workers’ ability to negotiate better wage and non-wage terms as
well as their share of the overall pie.
 Right to Information. Under the Supreme Court’s Truitt rule, an
employer that claims an inability to provide wage increases must
disclose financial information to support that claim. 83 But recent
decisions have limited employers’ disclosure obligation to
instances where they explicitly state that they cannot afford a
union demand, leaving employers significant opportunity for
strategic behavior by claiming alternative justifications for refusal
to agree to a higher wage, evading financial disclosure
requirements and creating an information asymmetry between
workers and employers at the bargaining table. 84 The Board and
the courts have delineated workers’ right to financial information
without economic analysis of how the right affects bargaining
power while simultaneously limiting unions’ access to economic
data that it could use to substantiate wage demands as a matter of
doctrine. 85 Further, the limited (if any) ground-level data in the
Board’s case records limits its ability to determine whether
employers’ refusal to bargain on Truitt-related grounds is
justified.
 Coercion. The Supreme Court’s NuTone decision and subsequent
case law have held that, where an employer had mandatory
captive audience meetings with employees and committed an
83

NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956).
See, e.g., Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168,
1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992).
85
For a discussion of how information asymmetries create labor market
inefficiencies, see, e.g., Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the
American Economy, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 781-82 (2011); Michael L. Wachter,
Theories of the Employment Relationship, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 167-71 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 2004); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Employment, Social Justice and Societal Well-Being, 141 INT’L LAB. J. 9, 11,
14 (2002).
84
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unfair labor practice in its anti-union campaign, it was not an
unfair labor practice to forbid employees from engaging in
‘‘equal time’’ pro-union solicitation during working hours or to
distribute literature in the employer’s plant. 86 Pro-union
employees must overcome a presumption to get a ‘‘right of
reply’’ to employer’s anti-union speech, and only under very
special circumstances because the Court found that NLRA did
not grant employees an entitlement ‘‘to use a medium of
communication simply because the employer is using it.’’87 This
determination drew a line that restructured the relative rights of
employers and employees without reviewing empirical data or
assessing its material effects on worker bargaining power. Nor
did it have before it empirical studies that have since
demonstrated that captive audience meetings by employers are
intimidating and effective in defeating unions in representation
elections. 88 Courts have since found that employers do not
commit an unfair labor practice where they provide
‘‘predictions’’ (as opposed to ‘‘threats’’) of economic losses from
unionization or grant raises to non-unionized workers but not to
unionizing workers during elections, without assessing data on
the potential coercive effects of employers incentivizing antiunion decision-making on the NLRA’s purposes of equalizing
bargaining power and encouraging unionization. 89
 Collective Bargaining. The labor law distinguishes between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. 90 Employers
may make unilateral changes to collective bargaining agreements
if they bargain in good faith to an impasse on mandatory
bargaining subjects, and while neither party is obligated to
bargain on permissive subjects, employees are not protected if
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NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958); General Electric
Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966).
87
Id. at 363-64.
88
See Paul M. Secunda, The Future of NLRB Doctrine on Captive Audience
Speeches, 87 INDIANA L.J. 123, 127 & n. 25 (2012) (collecting case law and data);
Secunda, The Contemporary ‘‘Fist Inside the Velvet Glove’’: Employer Captive Audience
Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 F LA. INT’L. U.L. REV. 385, 391-99 (2011) (same).
89
See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. 575, 617-19 (1969); Arc Bridges,
Inc. v. NLRB, No. 15-1113, 2017 WL 2818637 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2017).
90
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
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they strike on a permissive subject. 91 Jurisprudence on what
constitutes a permissive rather than mandatory subject of
bargaining has neither considered economic evidence nor
evaluated the economic effects of granting either party the right
to engage in a protected hold up or to use a strike threat to affect
the employers’ ‘‘best alternatives to a negotiated agreement’’
(BATNA). 92 Plant closures were deemed permissive subjects of
bargaining because, the Supreme Court held, while the Act
requires bargaining over the effects of management decisions, it
does not require bargaining over the decisions themselves. 93 But
the Court required neither an economic test nor provided an
economic or empirical basis to substantively justify the
distinction between ‘‘effects-bargaining’’ and ‘‘decisionbargaining.’’94 Thus, where plant closures are challenged,
employers need not present their economic justifications for
closure unless there is evidence of anti-union animus, and neither
the employees nor the adjudicators have data to evaluate whether
it is legitimately justified or whether the benefit for labormanagement relations and the bargaining process outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business. 95 Further, no
evidence regarding the economic circumstances that aid in an
employer’s capacity to grant concessions is required for
determining whether an employer has engaged in good-faith
bargaining, so neither the employees nor the adjudicators can
make a determination on the basis of any data. 96 Where the Board
and the courts make no such assessment, they are left flat-footed
91

NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744-46 (1962); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-57 (1939)
92
See, e.g., First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 684-86
(1981) (holding plant closures a permissive subject of bargaining); Pall Corporation v.
NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding card-check agreements about
employer’s new facilities a permissive subject of bargaining). For BATNA, see ROGER
F ISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 97-106 (3d ed. 2011).
93
452 U.S. at 681-82.
94
See, e.g., Dubuque Packing Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 499 (1987).
95
See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1378-94 (1988).
96
See, e.g., H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Gissel Packing,
395 U.S. 575; Katz, 369 U.S. 736; Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342. For a fuller discussion
of the need for having ‘‘relevant economic and financial data be on the table, ’’ see
Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the
NLRA, 71 TEX. L. REV. 921, 985 (1993).
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in being able to ensure their decisions fulfill the purposes of the
labor law in equalizing employer-employee bargaining power.
 Concerted Activity. While Section 7 of the Act protects workers’
right ‘‘to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,’’ the
impact of employee strikes has been significantly eroded by
decisions that preserve self-help protections for employers while
denying such protections to employees, and then further limiting
employee protections depending on whether employer self-help
would allow employers to successfully ride out a strike. 97 For
example, while employees’ right to conduct a full strike is
protected, employers do not violate the Act if they hire
permanent replacements during such a strike. 98 In making that
determination, the Supreme Court neither considered its effects
on worker bargaining power nor mandated a quantitative analysis
of the employers’ diversification of assets, loss in relation to
need, or other considerations that might determine whether the
self-help was adequately justified for continued business
operations. Further, the Court failed to consider how a rule
allowing for strike replacements may privilege more skilled
workers over unskilled workers because unskilled workers are
easier to replace, turning a law that was intended to protect
vulnerable workers into one that both protects their bargaining
power least and exposes weaker workers to the greatest costs. 99
Further, employees are not protected when they engage in a
range of concerted activity that makes them difficult to replace:
sit-downs, slowdowns, overtime strikes, intermittent strikes, and
partial strikes. 100 In making the determination that these types of
strikes are not protected, neither the Board nor the courts
provided an economic or empirically-based analysis of whether
they were more or less disruptive than full strikes, nor did they
assess how the decision to deem them unprotected would affect
worker bargaining power. While it is clear that, in a full strike,
employers can rely on permanent replacements to keep the
97
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business running, employers face limited self-help options in sitdowns and the forms of partial strike. But if the purpose of the
NLRA is to equalize bargaining power between employers and
employees, empirical assessment and a metric is required to
determine the relative hold-out capacity of both parties to ensure
that the Board or the courts do not tip the balance in favor of
either.
These examples illustrate not only that the social scientific bases for
the Board and the courts’ decision-making on core aspects of the NLRA’s
mandate are deficient, but they also reveal workers to be the more likely
victim of haphazardly-decided precedent, with profound regulatory
effects.
2. Institutional Effects
It is no secret that the Board has a reputation for being the most
‘‘political’’ of the agencies, primarily because its adjudications have flipflopped from administration to administration following partisan
appointments. 101 Such flip-flopping-----as in the much-publicized switching
of Board positions on whether graduate students are ‘‘employees’’
protected by the NLRA102-----‘‘feeds a political narrative of an out-ofcontrol Board that must be throttled by the legislative and judicial
branches of government.’’103 The absence of an institutional role for
economic and social scientific analysis contributes to the reputation of the
agency as having political or ideological bases for its regulation as
opposed to more objective bases grounded in expertise. 104 Such grounding
would shift the burden of proof to the Board’s detractors to support their
criticisms with equally probative evidence based in data and rigorous
analysis thereof rather than ideological arguments or purely abstract,
common law-based arguments about rights untethered to how employer or
employee conduct impact those rights. 105
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Failure to utilize such expertise can have institutional effects on the
Board’s legitimacy in the public eye and as viewed by Congress and the
courts. 106 Other agencies’ use of frequent rulemaking, and accompanying
requirement to engage in cost-benefit analysis and substantively respond to
notice and comment, has allowed them to evolve in tandem with current
administrative law standards, including doctrinal developments in what is
required for such cost-benefit analysis at the agency level. 107 But ‘‘[t]he
fact that the NLRB eschews . . . rulemaking makes it immune to the
frequent post-Administrative Procedure Act waves of regulatory reform
that have focused on the rationalization and coordination of informal
rulemaking.’’108 The Board’s institutional role has already fallen far in the
eyes of the judiciary from the days of Jones & Laughlin, as recently
demonstrated by its Supreme Court’s dramatic discrediting and refusal to
grant it deference in Hoffman Plastics based in part on its lack of social
scientific expertise. 109 With courts taking a more aggressive role in their
review of agency procedure and conclusions in conducting cost-benefit
analyses, 110 the Board’s failure to engage in economic analysis makes it all
the more vulnerable to judicial rebukes and substitutions of their own
judgment where the Board has demonstrated a lack of expertise. 111 The
ban handcuffs the Board, and by undercutting its expertise, frustrates the
NLRA drafters’ intent of delegating labor regulation to an independent
agency to which the courts should defer. 112
The Board’s isolation has also meant that it has a less dominant role in
106
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shaping and contributing to normative debates about the importance of
unionization in the broader suite of workers’ rights and protections. 113 It
has also meant that it must formulate labor policy within the complex
patchwork of other federal statutes-----the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, Title VII, and so on-----blind not only
to the effects of its agency actions on workers’ Section 7 rights, 114 but also
to the ripple effects on broader labor and employment policy. Moreover,
its dominant regulation by adjudication has primarily excised its role in
collecting data and information about or in recognizing the status of
Section 7 protections in unorganized sectors of the economy that lack live
adjudications. 115
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The Federal government’s Executive branch currently employs 4,640
economists doing primarily statistical, regulatory, and redistributive data
collection and analysis. 116 The statistical work-----exemplified by the work
of the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis and Census
Bureau-----involves collecting, synthesizing and analyzing data, producing
official government statistics, generating government estimates for broad
consumption, and honing data-collection and interpretation methods. 117
Regulatory economic work primarily involves using applied
microeconomics to: generate and revise regulations; and conduct
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economic analysis to investigate whether current regulations are effective
and/or have been violated. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and Federal Reserve primarily use economists for this
purpose. 118 Finally, economists at agencies like the Social Security
Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor, and
others, provide support and calculate penalties that are redistributive, such
as helping devise income support programs, subsidies and tax credits as
well as fines, fees and taxes. 119 Some-----like economists in the Treasury
Department, Federal Reserve, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the EPA-----do economy-wide modeling to assess the macroeconomic
effects of regulations or policies. 120
While the nature and extent of economic analysis performed in
administrative agencies depends on statutory requirements, developments
in administrative law, and agencies’ respective regulatory functions, as a
general matter, agencies have evolved different strategies and approaches
to conducting and integrating economic analysis into those functions. This
section provides an overview of agency best practices in utilizing
economic analysis with respect to four key areas: (1) engaging in but not
limiting analysis to the costs and benefits of particular regulations; (2)
policy-setting and litigation support; (3) incorporating broader social
scientific developments in economic theory and behavioral science; and
(4) utilizing both microeconomic and macroeconomic modeling.
A. Economic Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The economic analysis of law in administrative agencies extends far
beyond Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) performed to fulfill costbenefit analysis requirements of economically significant rules. 121 While
the costs and benefits of itself mandating cost-benefit analysis have been
and continues to be debated, 122 economists in administrative agencies
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engage in a much broader set of economic and social scientific analyses as
a part of agency functioning. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to this broader
set of analyses as ‘‘economic analysis’’ and attempt to delineate them here.
First, a brief exposition on how economists aid in cost-benefit analysis
at the agency level. With the help of guidance from the OMB and
OIRA, 123 agencies work with economists to both develop and implement
agency-specific guidance on best practices for conducting cost-benefit
analysis. 124 Economists assist at each stage of the multi-step process of
cost-benefit analysis: stating the need for regulatory action; defining the
baseline of the world but for the action; setting the time horizon of the
analysis; identifying a range of regulatory alternatives and their
consequences; quantifying and monetizing the benefits and costs;
discounting future benefits and costs; evaluating non-quantified and nonmonetized benefits and costs; and characterizing uncertainty in the overall
analysis. 125
While Executive agencies are required by Executive Order and statute
to conduct cost-benefit analysis in certain rulemakings, absent mandates in
their organic statutes, independent agencies are subject to lesser
requirements. 126 Commentators have claimed that independent agencies
See OIRA, ‘‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer’’; Circular A-4: Regulatory
Analysis, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET (2003) [hereinafter ‘‘OMB Guidance’’].
124
See, e.g., Memorandum for RSFI and OGC to the Staff of the Rulewriting
Divisions and Offices of the SEC (Mar. 16, 2012), available at:
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf; U.S.
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‘‘lack the capability to conduct cost-benefit analyses of the quality that is
commonplace in the Executive Branch, in part as a result of the role of the
[OIRA].’’127 However, with the exception of the NLRB, many independent
agencies have more economists on staff than OIRA’s 45: the EPA employs
176 economists; the SEC, 110; and the FTC, 81. 128
But economists on staff at independent agencies do much more than
frame and conduct cost-benefit analyses. For example, in addition to
providing basic technical and statistical assistance, the SEC’s Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) engages in broad data collection and
analysis as well as economic modeling and forecasting. Craig Lewis,
DERA’s former Chief Economist, distinguished ‘‘cost-benefit analysis’’
from broader ‘‘economic analysis’’ of which it is ‘‘one aspect,’’ describing
the latter as ‘‘the consideration of the potential economic effects-----i.e.,
effects on the market-----of the SEC’s policy choices.’’129 DERA describes
itself as the SEC’s ‘‘think tank,’’ ‘‘integrat[ing] financial economics and
rigorous data analytics into the core mission of the SEC . . . across the
entire range of SEC activities, including policy-making, rule-making,
enforcement, and examination.’’130 Created in 2009, DERA has ten offices
engaged in ‘‘quantitative research and risk assessment,’’ including:
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C. ). However, independent agencies are subject to the requirements of
three cost-benefit analysis-related statutes: the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. No.
104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520) (requiring agencies to
justify public information collection, to minimize the burden of any informationcollection process, and to maximize the utility of information gathered); the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601612) (requiring agencies to assess and consider alternatives to the burden of regulation on
small entities); and the Congressional Review Act, Contract with America Advancement
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (codified as amended in 5
U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.) (requiring agencies to submit proposed rules-----along with any
cost-benefit analysis the agencies have conducted-----to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)).
127
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providing ‘‘high-quality economic and statistical analyses, and specific
subject-matter expertise’’ within the SEC; ‘‘[i]dentifying and analyzing
issues, trends, and innovations in the marketplace’’; developing
customized tools and analyses to ‘‘proactively detect market risks’’;
working with outside experts to ‘‘strengthen the Commission’s foundation
of market knowledge’’; managing and analyzing public and private data
‘‘to support relevant initiatives and projects’’; conducting research and
publishing in peer-reviewed journals; and participating in academic and
industry conferences. 131 DERA economists and experts also support the
SEC’s enforcement actions by estimating ‘‘the amount of ill-gotten gains
and providing critiques of expert witness testimony’’ as well as assisting
other Divisions when ‘‘there are breaking events in the markets, providing
data analysis and other technical expertise.’’132
Key to DERA’s ability to engage in broader economic analysis is its
enhanced use of data analyses. For example, in rulemaking defining
‘‘security-based swap dealer’’ or a ‘‘major security-based swap
participant,’’ DERA economists ‘‘analyzed voluminous amounts of
transaction and position data to examine the amount of CDS [credit default
swap] dealing activity that would be covered --- and likewise, the amount of
dealing activity that would be unregulated --- under various de minimis
thresholds.’’133 After the rulemaking, the Division produced a
memorandum ‘‘describing its analysis of the CDS data, along with the
methodologies and assumptions underlying that analysis’’ for future use. 134
DERA economists also collect and analyze data ‘‘in previously largely
unregulated areas,’’ for example, by ‘‘identify[ing] types of participants in
the CDS market, the frequency of their participation, concentrations of
risk, and how this risk travels across jurisdictional boundaries’’ to ensure
the SEC can fulfill its statutory mandate as complex markets evolve. 135
DERA thus pushes the SEC beyond its current docket and dependence on
131
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parties’ submissions, deploying ‘‘its econometric abilities to ascertain for
itself the economic reality of financial markets before it seeks to regulate
them.’’136
Finally, DERA’s integration of economic analysis beyond mere
technical assistance with rulemakings includes a broader application of
social scientific developments and insights into the SEC’s work. DERA
‘‘promot[es] collaborative efforts throughout the agency and breaking
through silos that might otherwise limit the impact of the agency’s
institutional expertise.’’137 Prior to the creation of the Division, the
relationship between economists and policymakers was described by an
insider as in ‘‘a stable dysfunctional equilibrium.’’138 Much like the
NLRB’s DER, economists were ‘‘bystanders’’ pursuing their own research
interests, and policymakers policed their imposition of data and analyses
that could ‘‘limit their policy discretion.’’139 However, DERA’s creation
and institutional transformation, personnel turnovers at key levels in the
Divisions, and external pressure imposed by the courts to better justify
SEC rulemakings ‘‘encouraged a new working relationship that puts
economists at the table from the beginning of each rule to the end. ’’140 The
SEC’s 2012 Guidance ‘‘in effect amended the micro-constitution of the
SEC staff, elevating the economist to the status of a co-equal branch of the
agency’’ so that ‘‘old habits, presumptions, and prejudices’’ are now
‘‘largely gone.’’141
B. Policy-Setting vs. Litigation Support
The role of agency economists in setting policy as opposed to
providing on litigation support depends on the agency. For example, the
50 Ph.D. economists in the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) at the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division are primarily trained in Industrial
136

Kraus, supra note 135, at 300 (emphasis added).
SEC, About the Division, supra note 130.
138
Kraus, supra note 135, at 302.
139
Id.
140
Id. For judicial interventions faulting the SEC for inadequate economic analysis in
rulemakings, see, e.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For broader
assessment of how the SEC transformed itself to better survive judicial scrutiny, see
Joshua T. White, The Theory and Structure of Financial Regulatory Agencies, 50 GA. L.
REV. 293, 307-24 (2015).
141
Id.
137

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION

33

Organization and applied microeconomics. 142 EAG is composed of three
sections: Competition Policy, Economic Litigation, and the Economic
Regulatory Sections. 143 Overall, their work is primarily litigation-focused,
working in teams with the Antitrust Division’s attorneys ‘‘on every civil
investigation of proposed mergers or possible anticompetitive business
conduct by firms’’ which involves, at the early stages of an investigation:
(1) interviewing firm executives and evaluating company documents and
data to determine how to model the industry at issue; (2) identifying
potentially dispositive facts and empirical projects therefrom; (3) defining
the potential competitive theories of harm; and (4) shaping projects to test
those theories. 144 They brief the Division’s ‘‘top decision makers during
the course of an investigation and make a recommendation on whether to
challenge the merger or conduct.’’145 If the Division decides to go forward
in challenging the conduct, EAG economists support and prepare expert
testimony and work as members of the case team on trial strategy and
execution. 146 While economists are encouraged to pursue personal research
projects as well as publish and participate in conferences, their main
policy-setting function is researching and amending the Department of
Justice’s Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 147
While some commentators have criticized both the Antitrust Division
and the FTC for not engaging sufficiently in policy-setting and
rulemaking, 148 others criticize agencies like the SEC for failing to fully
integrate economists into enforcement. 149 For example, after the D.C.
Circuit struck down the SEC’s first rule promulgated under the DoddDEP’T
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Frank Act-----the ‘‘proxy access rule’’-----commentators criticized the fact
that DERA ‘‘has no authority to participate in the decision to bring an
investigation or action nor to set the ground rules for how the SEC
Enforcement Division prioritizes its caseload or determines penalties and
settlements.’’150 They instead put the FTC forward as a model for how to
incorporate ‘‘economic analysis into [the SEC’s] enforcement process,’’
and by extension, that of other independent agencies. 151
The FTC’s Bureau of Economics employs 81 economists divided
between consumer protection and antitrust activities. 152 In the consumer
protection area, economists assist in both litigation and policy-setting,
including: assessing the costs and benefits of pursuing enforcement
actions; evaluating proposals for investigations, complaints, consent
negotiations, and settlements; providing litigation support and day-to-day
guidance on individual matters; and developing and disseminating
‘‘historical and analytical information needed to devise sound consumer
protection policy.’’153 Economists’ role in antitrust regulation is more
focused on litigation-----performing an almost identical role to those in the
EAG-----with a smaller research and policy assessment program. 154
FTC economists’ role has been highlighted as exemplary because of
the early and important function they play in its decisions to bring
enforcement actions. 155 In the 1970s, economists were elevated in both the
Antitrust Division and the FTC through institutional changes that shifted
enforcement priorities based on developments in industrial organization
theory. 156 Economists conducted empirical research to ‘‘spur[] [theoretical]
developments and adjustments in antitrust doctrine and enforcement
policy’’ in a feedback loop. 157 Economists’ elevated participation also
150
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altered the agency’s metrics of success: instead of determining whether
enforcement goals were met based on the number of cases brought or the
size of either the target of investigation or the agency’s recovery, success
was determined based on how likely it would be that the enforcement
actions would deter future anticompetitive conduct or vindicate a novel
legal theory based on economic analysis. 158
Extrapolating best practices from the success of integrating economists
into agency antitrust enforcement, it is clear that incorporating economic
analysis is critical at the earliest stages, from aiding in the systematic
development of enforcement priorities to developing novel theories of
harm that maximize fulfillment of regulatory goals. It also demonstrates
the value of establishing economic divisions that have co-equal authority
and budgetary allocations to enforcement divisions as well as similar
reporting requirements to top-level decisionmakers within agencies. 159
C. Beyond Neoclassical Economics
For agency regulation to remain current and adaptive, incorporating
developments in economic theory and social science is key. These
developments can range from enhanced methods in economic modeling
and collecting empirical data, including gathering and incorporating ‘‘big
data,’’ to the rise of new economic approaches in new institutional or
behavioral economics. This subsection will concentrate on how two
agencies --- the SEC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) --- have integrated artificial intelligence (AI) research (financial
technology, or ‘‘FinTech,’’ and regulatory technology, or ‘‘RegTech’’)
and behavioral economics, respectively, into their regulatory functions.
First, AI research is useful to securities regulation because assessing
risk in financial markets is both difficult and time-consuming, and
RegTech automated supervision tools can amass a complex base of data,
track that data, and facilitate sophisticated reporting and monitoring that
mirrors the technological complexity of evolving markets. 160 Starting in
maintenance).
158
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159
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2015, the SEC began utilizing machine learning, and specifically, text
analytic methods, to determine whether it could have foreseen risks posed
by the rise and use of CDS contracts leading up to the financial crisis
through tracking rates at which such contracts were mentioned in Form
10-Ks and news articles from major news outlets. 161 Since then, DERA
has applied topic modeling methods such as latent dirichlet allocation
(LDA) to identify abnormal disclosures by corporate issuers charged with
wrongdoing. 162 They found that, ‘‘when firms were subject to financial
reporting-related enforcement actions, they made less use of an LDAidentified topic related to performance discussion.’’163 DERA has
expanded its use of topic modeling and other cluster analysis techniques to
efficiently identify latent trends in vast amounts of unstructured financial
information, and working with the SEC’s enforcement and investigation
teams, can ‘‘leverage knowledge from these collaborations to train the
machine learning algorithms.’’164 It thus incorporates the benefits of human
judgment in identifying possible fraud or misconduct in registrant
examinations to ‘‘train’’ an algorithm to find the same in new and existing
SEC filings. 165 Such methods have developed algorithms that have proven
five times better than random at identifying language in investment adviser
regulatory filings that could merit a referral to enforcement. 166
Second, the rise and integration of the behavioral sciences in
regulation, and specifically the use of ‘‘choice architecture’’ and ‘‘nudges’’
to impact outcomes, has been a transformative turn in administrative
regulation. 167 The ‘‘behavioral turn’’ has attempted to theorize, empirically
assess, and incorporate into agency action correctives for human cognition
errors-----primarily heuristics and biases-----that adversely affect welfareenhancing decision-making. 168 Agencies from the Food and Drug
Administration to the Federal Reserve have relied on behavioral research
161
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in issuing regulations like revising ‘‘nutrition facts’’ labeling on food
packages and forbidding banks from automatically enrolling customers in
overdraft protection programs. 169 To more broadly integrate these efforts
into agency regulation, and perhaps to preempt arbitrary and capricious
review of agency actions relying on behavioral science, President Obama
issued an Executive Order in 2015 encouraging federal agencies to
‘‘identify policies, programs and operations where applying behavioral
science insights may yield substantial improvements in public welfare,
program outcomes, and program cost effectiveness’’ and develop
strategies for applying such insights to programs. 170 The Order also
encouraged agencies to ‘‘recruit behavioral science experts to join the
Federal Government’’ and ‘‘strengthen agency relationships with the
research community to better use empirical findings from the behavioral
sciences.’’171
More than any other agency, the CFPB was founded upon and has
most directly incorporated the insights of behavioral science into its
regulation of consumer credit and other financial products. 172 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is tasked with ensuring that ‘‘markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive.’’173 In doing so, it must consider the ‘‘understanding by
consumers of the risks of a type of consumer financial product or
service,’’ a monitoring function that has invited the expertise of behavioral
scientists. 174 The CFPB established a Research, Markets and Regulations
Division coequal with its enforcement divisions targeting unfair lending
practices and consumer protection. 175 The Office of Research within the
Division contains a Decision-Making and Behavioral Studies Section
staffed with behavioral science experts. 176 The Section Chief leads an
169
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interdisciplinary team to research ‘‘household financial decision-making
and behavioral science,’’ provide ‘‘strategic and methodological guidance’’
on primary data collection, and supervise a number of key projects for the
CFPB. 177 Specifically, the Section team: designs and fields surveys to
develop insights into consumer financial decision-making and integrate
into the CFPB’s policy-making; supports CFPB rulemaking teams in
developing and implementing policy (including testing proposed financial
disclosures against the CFPB’s policy goals); advises cross-agency teams
on the design and evaluation of public-facing tools to support consumer
financial decision-making; develops and conducts experiments in
laboratory settings that contribute to the CFPB’s ‘‘foundational
knowledge’’ on consumer decision-making; and collaborates with financial
services providers to conduct field trials of financial products and
disclosures for ease of consumer comprehension. 178 Behavioral scientists
thus play a pivotal role in collecting data, policy-setting, determining
enforcement priorities, rulemaking, field enforcement, and integrating its
data and analyses throughout the agency.
The CFPB has also appointed prominent behavioral economists and
social scientists like Richard Thaler, John Campbell and Christine Jolls to
its Academic Research Council (ARC), which ‘‘advise[s] the Bureau’s
Office of Research on research methodologies, data collection, and
analytic strategies and provides feedback about research and strategic
planning.’’179 CFPB behavioral researchers have a symbiotic relationship
with ARC, presenting their research and receiving feedback on a range of
matters: disclosures in consumer financial products; the dynamics of
household balance sheets; trends in consumer finance research; measuring
costs and benefits of consumer financial regulation for consumers; the role
of payment heuristics in consumer decision-making on credit card bill
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payments; and so on. 180
D. Microeconomic vs. Macroeconomic Modeling
The bulk of the economic analysis discussed thus far involves applied
microeconomic analysis. While some Executive agencies quite explicitly
develop, utilize and rely on macroeconomic modeling as part of their core
functioning-----the Macroeconomic Analysis Staff at the Treasury
Department, the Macroeconomic and Quantitative Studies Section in the
Federal Reserve, the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Commerce
Department, and so on-----there is a heated scholarly debate about how far
‘‘law and macroeconomics’’ should extend beyond such agencies. 181 While
the crisis in microeconomic modeling has begun to abate, it is still raging
in the world of macroeconomic modeling. 182 The level of theoretical and
empirical uncertainty in macroeconomic modeling has led many to
condemn broad agency mandates to conduct macroeconomic analysis, and
some reject agency reliance on and integration of such analyses in policymaking altogether. 183
But, on a voluntary basis, and due to Congressional pressure, some
agencies have begun to venture into assessing the economy-wide effects of
their policies through macroeconomic modeling and forecasting. 184 The
180
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EPA’s National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE) is the most
prominent example. In 2010, the Agency developed Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses advising that, where substantial
environmental policy changes in one sector result in indirect consequences
in other sectors, ‘‘a general equilibrium framework, which captures
linkages between markets across the entire economy, may be a more
appropriate choice’’ for conducting economic analyses. 185 Such models
generally work by estimating a policy change’s impact by ‘‘‘shocking’ the
model’’ with a proposed regulation and then determining ‘‘changes in
economic welfare measures’’ based on the difference between the
equilibria before and after the ‘‘shock.’’186
The EPA has utilized general equilibrium frameworks-----computable
general equilibrium (CGE) modeling and Intertemporal General
Equilibrium Models-----to forecast changes in the economy resulting from
potential changes in environmental policy. 187 The agency describes the
strengths and weaknesses of such modeling in its Guidelines, including
their ability to forecast ‘‘large economy-wide impacts, especially when
indirect and interaction effects are expected to be significant,’’ such
impacts are anticipated over long time horizons, and the Agency seeks to
‘‘estimate the distributional impacts of policy shocks on household groups
or industrial sectors.’’188 The EPA has used CGE models to: conduct a
retrospective cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air Act; 189 quantify the
costs of mitigating greenhouse gases in accordance with the Kyoto
Protocol and proposed congressional actions on climate change; 190 and
assess the potential economy-wide impacts and social costs of an alternate
ozone standard. 191
‘‘new guidance mandating ‘whole economy’ modeling on major rules’’).
185
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III. INTEGRATING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS INTO LABOR REGULATION
While there are many avenues of integrating economic analysis into
labor regulation, this Section assesses three of the most practicable
options: (1) creating an interagency group on economic analysis of labor
and employment, a kind of labor ‘‘superagency’’; (2) mandating or
allowing OIRA review of NLRB rulemakings; and (3) developing the
NLRB’s internal capacity by reestablishing the DER. Of the three, I focus
most on the third as the necessary condition for robust agency
collaboration through the first two avenues.
A. Interagency Group on Economic Analysis of Labor and Employment
Interagency working groups (IWGs) facilitate the involvement of
Federal agencies with overlapping mandates and expertise to execute or
improve the achievement of statutory or regulatory goals. IWGs have been
established for a range of purposes, from ensuring immigrants receive
agency-wide labor and employment law protections in tandem with
immigration enforcement to determining the social cost of carbon. 192 IWGs
have been successful in harmonizing policy between agencies where
agency mandates overlap and can produce inconsistent results. For
example, the IWG on labor and immigration developed and issued an
important joint guidance for employers to ensure that internal audits of I-9
work authorization forms were conducted fairly and without
discrimination or retaliation against immigrant employees. 193 And the IWG
on the social cost of carbon (SCC) was able to develop a figure for the
SCC in 2009, adopt the value a year later after public comment, and issue
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 1 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
inforeg/scc-response-to-commments-final-july-2015.pdf. President Trump has since
disbanded the IWG on the Social Cost of Carbon. Presidential Executive Order on
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth § 5(b) (2017).
193
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DOJ, DHS Announce Joint
Guidance to Employers on Internal Form 1-9 Audits (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/doj-dhs-announce-joint-guidance-employers-internalform-i-9-audits.
192

42

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION

a revised estimate in 2013. 194 The IWG devised the value through using a
broad class of computational algorithms, and the process of estimating and
updating it was open and subject to public comment on both methods and
outcomes. 195 The IWG’s estimates have since been used in thirty-four
rulemakings performed by the EPA and the Departments of Energy,
Transportation, Agriculture and Housing and Urban Development as of
July 2015. 196 Its success in developing a very complex and politically
salient metric for valuing a central component to broader climate change
policy on carbon dioxide reductions has been heralded as a model for
cross-agency collaborations because of the transparency of its
methodology, establishment of protocols for dealing with uncertainties,
and allowing genuine opportunities for public participation and
comment. 197
As these examples illustrate, IWGs can serve as coordinating bodies
between agencies with overlapping purviews that would benefit from
relying on a centralized set of standards for regulatory consistency and
efficiency. The fragmented, ad hoc and uneven regulation of the
workplace between the various agencies that impact labor regulation and
labor markets could certainly benefit from harmonious standardization.
The Department of Labor, the NLRB, and the EEOC notoriously have
different definitions of ‘‘employer’’ and ‘‘employee,’’ which results in the
evolution of inconsistent workplace standards for various workplace rights
and bodies of doctrine that do not cohere a unified set of principles on
core regulatory triggers. 198 An IWG could aid in harmonizing this area of
law while also preserving the tailored utility of various jurisdictional
boundaries for each regulatory context.
Further, while the Department of Justice and the FTC have deftly
integrated economic analysis into their policymaking and enforcement,
they do not share their data, methods, analyses and policy prescriptions
with federal agencies that regulate labor and employment, a fact all the
more significant because they are charged with regulating anticompetitive
conduct in and impacts of mergers on labor markets. The way in which
194
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firm conduct, competition between firms, and market structures and
processes effect the workings of labor markets is not only critical
information for labor and workplace agencies, but should also inform their
regulatory priorities. For example, industries where employers have
monopsony power or have engaged in collusion to suppress wages should
be a regulatory priority for the enforcement of unionization protections,
wage-and-hour and overtime laws, and antidiscrimination laws because
workers under those circumstances have less bargaining power to correct
for the adverse efficiency and distributional effects that can result from
such anticompetitive conduct. 199
Finally, the Office of Economic Policy at the Treasury Department,
charged with analyzing and reporting on economic developments that
impact the creation of economic and job opportunities, has published a
series of papers and reports on the effect of non-compete agreements on
‘‘worker welfare, job mobility, business dynamics, and economic growth
more generally.’’200 The Office of Economic Policy was able to issue its
report on non-competes because of a ‘‘recent development of more
comprehensive data on their usage’’ from academic researchers, data the
policy implications of which could be assessed more fully in conjunction
with agencies also concerned with the protection of workplace rights and
regulating labor markets. 201
An Interagency Working Group on Economic Analysis of Labor and
Employment Law could serve as an economic analysis clearinghouse with
a ‘‘systemic viewpoint’’ for all agencies regulating labor and
employment. 202 Participating agencies could include the Department of
Labor, the NLRB, the EEOC, the Council of Economic Advisers, the
OMB, the Department of Justice, the FTC, Treasury Department, and the
National Economic Council. A collaborative effort is all the more
necessary because of the uneven levels of economic expertise as between
199
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these agencies: the NLRB and the EEOC have no economists on staff, and
the other agencies with robust economic research capabilities have no
institutionalized mechanism for sharing and diffusing their knowledge. An
IWG could facilitate genuine collaboration between these agencies and
create an infrastructure for researching and preparing not only first-rate
cost-benefit analyses but also broader economic analyses that could aid in
unifying incoherent or inconsistent labor and workplace regulation while
mutually reinforcing policy goals of competitive wages, job growth, and
reducing income inequality.
Where an IWG’s benefits would diminish would be in providing
agency-specific guidance on the range of matters that lack overlap but
require significant expertise. For example, the Board has developed
expertise in administering the NLRA in areas of a highly technical nature:
collective bargaining rules and duties, unfair labor practices, the range of
protected concerted activity, bargaining unit determinations, and more.
While integrating economic analysis into these areas of the Board’s
purview would add significant regulatory improvements, they would likely
not be worthy of interagency coordination, and the IWG ought not be
tasked with conducting economic analysis of them.
B. OIRA Review of NLRB Rulemakings
Another alternative for enhancing the NLRB’s economic expertise
would be to subject its major rulemakings to OIRA review, assuming
OIRA would have the authority to review its regulatory analyses as an
‘‘independent’’ agency. 203 Given the trend in more aggressive judicial
review of independent agency cost-benefit assessments, 204 OIRA review
could provide both a valuable institutional role and expertise to legitimize
203
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Board rulemakings and allow the NLRB to benefit from the experience of
other agencies that OIRA reviews. 205 For example, agencies could
harmonize their positions on a range of regulatory issues relating to labor
markets and workplace protections by encouraging OIRA to either mediate
between them or adopt a position that harmonizes their goals. 206
However, OIRA review would not be an ideal solution as a substitute
for the development of internal NLRB economic analysis expertise for a
number of reasons. First, the NLRB rarely engages in rulemaking, and as
discussed supra, there is a broader need for economic analysis in labor
regulation beyond the limited rulemaking and potential cost-benefit
analysis that the Board would engage in and apply. The Board would
ideally incorporate social scientific expertise into its enforcement
decisions, adjudication, priority setting and policy-making. Further, while
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between OIRA and independent
agencies have resulted in mixed success, 207 the utter lack of economists on
staff to collaborate with or properly receive technical guidance and
quantitative assistance from OIRA staff, and similarly, OIRA’s limited
expertise on labor law, would all make any partnership a challenging one.
C. Internal Division of Economic Research at the NLRB
By far the most comprehensive and efficient solution to providing
much-needed social scientific expertise at the Board would be to
reestablish an internal DER. Expertise developed in an internal Division
could elicit the enforcement and policy-setting benefits described supra:
enhancing informed decision-making in agency actions; aligning labor
regulation with state-of-the-art social scientific research and economic
realities; and honing Board expertise on what kind of economic evidence
is necessary for the efficient resolution of adjudicative or other regulatory
problems, including being better able to parse evidence presented to it by
205
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parties. The Board’s repeat exposure to labor law cases would give it the
opportunity to further collect data and integrate industry-specific
challenges to resolving labor disputes into a broader, social scientific
perspective on what kinds of disputes commonly arise in what settings.
Systematizing that knowledge would improve the Board’s policy-making
and better justify judicial deference to its expertise.
Like other regulatory agencies that have taken steps to improve their
capacity to gather, analyze and integrate economic and broader social
scientific data, the Board could first develop an internal blueprint of best
practices as well as draft and publish internal guidelines for preparing
economic analysis. 208 The OMB’s Circular A-4 could serve as initial
guidance, but guidelines of other agencies like the EPA’s NCEE and the
SEC’s DERA, which extend beyond quantification strategies for costbenefit analyses in RIAs, could provide supplementary models for the
scope of the Division’s guidelines. The Division could update those
guidelines in a continuing effort to enhance its expertise and could solicit
public feedback and comments for improvements.
Division guidelines could lay out standard practices for developing and
disseminating analytical advice to the Board’s various offices and
divisions, including to Board Members and the Board’s General Counsel.
The Division could also be responsible for funding outside projects and
soliciting expertise from the academic community. 209 Just like its earlier
incarnation, the Division could research and draft reports on issues critical
for efficient enforcement of the NLRA, including, for example, the status
of joint employment and its affect on Section 7 rights, the accuracy with
which employers designate workers-----such as supervisors, managerial
staff, and independent contractors-----as exempt from the NLRA, and so on.
The Board’s own adjudications could serve as a Bayesian source of data
collection, 210 but the Division need not limit itself to research data from
workplaces with already unionized employees.
Another benefit of an internal Division is that it would liberate the
Board from being dependent on parties that appear before it for
information, thus limiting the likelihood of regulatory capture by the
208
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groups it is meant to be regulating. 211 Instead of deciding particular cases
exclusively on the basis of such private material, the Board could also rely
on industry-wide data, much as it did during the first DER’s years of
constitutional challenge. Institutional design is critical for ensuring agency
independence, and the best way of ‘‘imbed[ding] information generation
and dissemination into any agency’s structure’’ is to ‘‘create a research
arm in the agency to produce reports and studies and ensure that it is
adequately funded.’’212
While the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
already employs around 28% of economists in federal agencies-----1,284-----a
new DER would not be duplicative. The BLS serves as the ‘‘principal
Federal agency responsible for measuring labor market activity, working
conditions, and price changes in the economy,’’ but the Division would
collect different data, have a different mission, and would need policymaking integration and synergies independent of the BLS’s foci.
Specifically, the Division would gather and analyze information beyond
unionization rates213 to more broadly assess how economic realities affect
workers’ ability to exercise their Section 7 rights: their right to organize,
bargain collectively, engage in concerted activity, achieve equal
bargaining power with employers and so on. For example, the Division
could be tasked with collecting and analyzing data on how changes in
labor markets, labor market structures and processes, corporate
restructuring, inflation and pricing in product markets, employment rates,
unemployment, the relationship between labor productivity and wages,
and so on enhances or diminishes the exercise of Section 7 rights. How
does vertical disintegration affect unionization rates and why? How does
labor market segmentation affect workers’ right to collectively bargain?
What makes unionization more successful in certain industries over
others? Would an expansion of ‘‘joint employer’’ doctrine to allow
collective bargaining between directly employed and subcontracted
workers on the one hand with subcontracting employers on the other
overcome coordination costs between workers and ensure competitive
211
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wage rates? And so on. Further, the Division would have its own
independent interest in keeping up to date on developments in labor
economics, human relations, industrial organizations, behavioral science,
and other relevant social scientific fields for developments in how best to
advance worker protections under the NLRA. Finally, the BLS is not
tasked with evaluating the success of Board remedies, something an
internal Division would be best placed to investigate and propose
recommendations on to the extent they are deficient in meeting the
statute’s goals.
As a practical matter, the Board could reestablish the Division through
an internal operating rule and be prepared, in light of interceding
Executive injunctions and statutory mandates to conduct cost-benefit
analysis, to defend ‘‘the position that the Board no longer construes the
ban as broadly barring the internal development and evaluation of social
science evidence.’’214 Alternatively, Congress could repeal Section 4(a)
and allocate budgetary resources to build capacity for economic analysis in
a new Division. While the Board may face appropriations challenges, and
it may take time for a new Division to get up to speed, the examples cited
above from the SEC, the FTC, the EPA, and other agencies indicate that
these challenges are surmountable.
IV. MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION
A new DER could be charged first and foremost with assessing the
microeconomic effects of the NLRB’s current and future regulation as
well as its failure to regulate. This Section highlights key areas of focus
for researching and assessing such microeconomic effects and proposes
best practices for integrating microeconomic analysis into labor regulation.
It then provides an example-----the analysis of notice posting
requirements-----to illustrate how the Board could engage in analysis of
microeconomic effects.
214
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A. Microeconomic Effects of Labor Regulation
As mentioned supra, one purpose of the NLRA was to address the
adverse consequences of unequal bargaining power ‘‘between employees
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms
of ownership association’’ which ‘‘prevent[s] the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within industries.’’215 We
now understand competitive wages to be the product of well-functioning
labor markets free of market failures: monopsonistic or oligopsonistic
wage-setting; limited information or information asymmetries; and publicgoods problems, to name a few. 216 In 2016, the Obama Administration
issued Executive Order 13,725, declaring as a matter of policy that
‘‘[p]romoting competitive markets and ensuring . . . workers have access
to information needed to make informed choices must be a shared priority
across the Federal Government,’’ in both ‘‘Executive departments and
agencies.’’217 Agencies ‘‘can contribute to these goals through, among
other things, pro-competitive rulemaking and regulations, and by
eliminating regulations that create barriers to or limit competition.’’218 The
Order imposed responsibilities on ‘‘agencies with authorities that could be
used to enhance competition’’ to ‘‘use those authorities to promote
competition’’ and ‘‘identify specific actions that they can take in their
areas of responsibility to build upon efforts to detect abuses such as price
215
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fixing, [and] anticompetitive behavior in labor and other input markets. .
.’’219
The Board’s failure to engage in economic analysis has limited its
ability to assess the effects of its adjudication and rulemaking, as well as
its failure to act or set regulatory priorities, on workers’ ability to
collectively combat employer monopsony or oligopsony power to set
infracompetitive wages and non-wage terms, 220 to overcome information
asymmetries that decrease their bargaining power (from information about
employer finances or decisions to close plants to basic information about
their Section 7 rights), and to solve public-goods problems in the
workplace through mandatory collective bargaining instead of relying on
inefficient market-based exit.
In assessing the microeconomic effects of its actions (or failures to
act), the Board-----through a new DER-----should not only assess effects on
static allocative efficiency but also on dynamic efficiency. 221 Under a static
efficiency model, assuming there are no recruitment or training costs, any
amount of labor can be recruited at zero cost as long as the wage paid by
an employer is at or above the competitive level, but no labor is available
at any cost if a wage below the competitive wage is offered. 222 In other
words, under this model, ‘‘the tiniest wage cut results in the complete
inability to recruit any workers at all’’ because workers would either reject
offers under the competitive wage or quit to work at a competitor firm if
his or her wage was below the competitive wage. 223
But work is rarely sold on a ‘‘spot market’’ for immediate delivery,
where workers contract to provide labor in one-off exchanges with
employers and their wages are competitively determined by the instant
valuation of their marginal revenue product of their labor. Instead,
compensation is determined in a world of incomplete contracts where
worker productivity fluctuates and wages are determined dynamically,
219
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through repeated or long-term exchange. 224 Thus, in order to consider the
microeconomic effects of labor regulation, and in accordance with the
NLRA’s vision and goal of long-term collective bargaining in employment
relationships, a new DER should consider dynamic efficiencies, or
whether labor law rules are welfare enhancing over time. For example,
regulating to ensure dynamic efficiencies could assess whether labor law
rules enhance employee-employer welfare in a way that incorporates longterm worker productivity cycles. It could also assess whether rules create
a ‘‘calculative trust’’ between employers and employees that encourages
cooperation over conflict, or a ‘‘goodwill trust’’ where the parties are
willing to perform over and above the literal terms of the contract to
enhance flexibility, open-ended cooperation, and ‘‘productivity on longterm productive investments in skills and technology.’’225 The Division
could research the degree to which certain labor law rules over others
create ‘‘an environment which is favourable to the emergence of high-trust
employment relationships’’ based on their relative impact on workers’ job
satisfaction, fairness in treatment, and income and job security. 226 Key
here would be an analysis of how labor market segmentation-----or
allocating different wages per ‘‘efficiency unit’’ for workers with
comparable skills and efficiencies-----has been effectuated through contract
‘‘design discrimination’’ that: excises large numbers of workers from
NLRB jurisdiction; pits direct employees against temporary, outsourced
and subcontracted employees that are not able to collectively bargain with
de facto employers; and results in wage discrimination. 227 Where wage
discrimination can result in lower average productivity, a decline in
product innovation, or other adverse effects, the Division should consider
how labor law rules-----from determining whether an indirect employer is a
‘‘joint employer’’ to bargaining unit determination for collective
bargaining-----can improve dynamic efficiency. 228
B. Towards Integrating Microeconomic Analysis into Labor Regulation
A new DER at the Board would be poised to benefit from lessons
learned in applied microeconomic analysis done in other agencies as well
as agencies’ broader integration of social scientific methods from
224
225
226
227
228
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behavioral science.
First, like the original DER, the staff of a new Division would ideally
be interdisciplinary. While the majority of staff could have expertise in
labor economics, a new DER could have researchers trained in behavioral
science, industrial organizations, theory of the firm, sociology, industrial
and organizational psychology, mathematical statistics and data science,
just like the current staff of the BLS and the Office of Research at the
CFPB. It could have co-equal authority with the General Counsel and the
authority to provide supplemental staff reports or sign off on the General
Counsel’s staff reports, like the SEC’s DERA staff. 229
Second, the new DER’s scrutiny of microeconomic effects could be
incorporated into enforcement and policy-setting, litigation and
rulemaking. It would thus be capable of conducting cost-benefit analyses
as well as broader economic analysis. 230 For significant rulemaking, the
DER could run extensive field studies to determine an empirical basis for
regulation and collect economic and industrial relations data, providing the
strongest possible underpinning for judicial review. 231 The DER could also
conduct independent research projects and draft policy papers in areas of
critical interest for the Board and for public dissemination. For
enforcement actions and adjudications, the DER could assist the General
Counsel and the Regional Directors in setting enforcement priorities,
ranking cases in terms of the typical net harm caused to workers by
different types of unfair labor practices in priority industries. Such
prioritization could aid in deterring future wrongdoing with the biggest
payoff while also allowing the Board’s enforcement arm to test novel legal
theories, say, on the breadth of joint employment doctrine. The new DER
could also assist in promulgating guidance about how to calculate
economic harm in other contexts that it purports to regulate (for example,
where collective bargaining works well or is dominant in a given industry;
what the history of labor and employment violations are in that industry;
and what has served as effectuating compliance and internal controls).
Finally, the DER could aid in reviewing enforcement personnel by scoring
the relative economic impact of enforcement cases resolved annually,
compare enforcement actions against economic data on union density, the
rates of occurrence of unfair labor practices, successful cost-benefit
analyses reached, recidivism rates of labor law violators in relation to the
remedies imposed, and so on. In sum, the DER’s involvement in Board
229
230
231
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action could change its calculus on enforcement significantly.
Third, when conducting microeconomic analyses of the Board’s
actions or failure to act, the DER could also work to develop and integrate
behavioral scientific studies and data into its assessments. For example, it
could conduct controlled research trials on labor law rules concerning,
say, the timing of mandatory employer captive audience meetings with
unionizing employees before a representation election to test how workers
respond. 232 Instead of the Board relying on its ‘‘common sense’’
assumptions about ‘‘the effects of employer conduct on employee
protected rights, and the implications of union activities on employers’
managerial and property prerogatives,’’ it should ‘‘be sensitized to
behavioral science inputs’’ as a consumer of behavioral evidence and
‘‘should assume the burdens of conducting, facilitating, and guiding
behavioral research on labor-management relations by establishing . . . a
separate unit devoted to behavioral research’’ in the DER for both intraagency and external use. 233 Such research could take the form of
Behavioral Impact Statements that would become part of the Board’s
official record to which parties and the public could respond. 234
C. Case Study: Notice Posting Requirements
If any story could demonstrate the NLRB’s ‘‘administrative law
exile,’’ it is the story of the failure of its third major rulemaking requiring
the posting of employees’ NLRA rights in their workplaces. 235
Specifically, the rule required employers subject to the NLRA ‘‘to post
notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of their
NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and information
concerning basic enforcement procedures,’’ in the language set forth in an
appendix listing: (1) employees’ Section 7 rights; (2) unlawful employer
conduct under the Act; (3) unlawful union conduct under the Act; (4)
employer and union duties and remedies for illegal conduct; and (5) itself
as ‘‘an official Government Notice.’’236 The rule also created a few
enforcement mechanisms. First, employers’ failure to post the notice
232
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could ‘‘be found to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by NLRA Section 7 . . . in violation of’’
the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provision, Section 8(a)(1). 237 Second, the
Board could suspend the running of the six-month limitations period for a
filing of any unfair labor practice charge ‘‘unless the employee has
received actual or constructive notice that the conduct complained of is
unlawful.’’238 And finally, the Board could consider an employer’s
‘‘knowing and willful refusal to comply with the requirement to post the
employee notice as evidence of unlawful motive in a case in which motive
is an issue.’’239
The Board invoked Section 6 of the NLRA for its authority to
promulgate the rule, which states that the ‘‘Board shall have authority
from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed
by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions’’ of the Act. 240 The need for
notice posting, the Board stated, was that ‘‘it ha[d] reason to think that
most’’ employees ‘‘do not’’ know their NLRA rights, and ‘‘[f]or
employees to fully exercise’’ them, ‘‘they must know that those rights
exist and that the Board protects’’ them. 241 The exclusive evidence that the
Board cited for this proposition were three law review articles from the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 242 The Board cited the same law review
articles to explain why the knowledge gap existed: ‘‘the low percentage of
employees who are represented by unions, and thus lack an important
source of information about NLRA rights; the increasing proportion of
immigrants in the workforce, who are unlikely to be familiar with their
workplace rights; and lack of information about labor law and labor
relations on the part of high school students who are about to enter the
labor force.’’243
Both the D.C. and the Fourth Circuits struck down the rule on
237
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statutory grounds under separate reasoning. 244 Despite widespread
criticism of the merits of those decisions, the Board declined to appeal
either ruling and chose instead to rescind the rule. 245 The decisions and the
Board’s subsequent rescission are a cautionary tale, and because of their
potential chilling effect on future Board rulemaking, it is critical to walk
through how the outcome may have been different if: (1) the Board had
developed a robust social scientific record of why the notice posting rule
was ‘‘necessary to carry out the provisions’’ of the NLRA; and (2) the
Board had consistently engaged in rulemaking rather than adjudication in
setting policy, thus inviting judicial review of its rulemaking authority
alongside the evolution of administrative law doctrine as applied to other
agencies.
As to the first point, the trouble began with Board Member Brian
Hayes. Member Hayes dissented to the final rule on grounds that the
‘‘Board’s rulemaking authority, broad as it is, does not encompass
authority to promulgate a rule of this kind,’’ and even if it did, ‘‘the action
taken here is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore invalid, because it is
not based on substantial evidence and it lacks a reasoned analysis.’’246 On
the first point, Member Hayes argued that, because Congress gave the
NLRB no express authority to require notice posting, and it did not either
explicitly or implicitly delegate authority to the NLRB to cure an
ambiguity or address a gap in the statutory scheme through a noticeposting rule, the rule was ultra vires. 247 Member Hayes noted that, while
the Department of Labor promulgated a notice-posting rule under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) despite the fact that ‘‘that statute does not
contain a specific statutory provision in workplace postings,’’ the FLSA
was distinguishable from the NLRA because it ‘‘imposes a data-collection
and recordkeeping requirement on employers.’’248 For the latter point----that the rule is arbitrary and capricious-----Member Hayes argued that
deference to the Board was unwarranted under Chevron and the APA
244
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because ‘‘[n]either the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking nor today’s notice
come anywhere close to providing a substantial factual basis supporting
the belief that most employees are unaware of their NLRA rights. ’’249
Citing Business Roundtable as precedent for finding agency action
arbitrary and capricious for ‘‘relying on insufficient empirical data . . .
and by completely discounting contrary studies,’’ Member Hayes
excoriated the Board for providing: ‘‘no empirical evidence of a
correlation between union density and access to information about
employee rights, just as there are no broad-based studies supporting the
suppositions about a lack of information stemming from high school
curricula or the influx of immigrants in the work force.’’250 Member
Hayes continued his criticism:
At bottom, the inadequacy of the record to support my
colleagues’ factual premise is of no matter to them. In
response to comments contending that the articles and
studies they cite are old and inadequately supported, they
glibly respond that the commentators ‘‘cite no more recent
or better supported studies to the contrary,’’ as if opponents
of the proposed rule bear that burden. Of course, it is the
agency responsibility to make factual findings that support
its decision and those findings must be supported by
substantial evidence that must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.
Even more telling is the majority’s footnote observation that
there is no real need to conduct a study of the extent of
employees’ knowledge of NLRA rights because the notice
posting rule would be justified even if only 10 percent of
the workforce lacked such knowledge. This statement
betrays the entire factual premise upon which the
rulemaking initiative was purportedly founded and reveals a
predisposition to issue the rule regardless of the facts. This
is patently ‘‘arbitrary and capricious.’’251
The appellate courts agreed. The D.C. Circuit began its opinion by
noting that the Board’s action
249
250
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departs from its historic practice. From its inception in
1935, the Board has exhibited a ‘‘negative attitude’’ toward
setting down principles in rulemaking, rather than
adjudication. Despite its ‘‘broad’’ rulemaking authority
under § 6 of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board
had ‘‘used rulemaking as a means of announcing-----or
considering-----its policies on only a few occasions’’ until
1989, the year in which it issued the substantive regulation
upheld in American Hospital. 252
The Fourth Circuit noted the same: ‘‘[t]he challenged rule is unusual in
several respects. The Board has only rarely engaged in rulemaking during
its seventy-seven year history. And it has never promulgated a noticeposting rule of any kind,’’ even though it conceded that the Board has
prospectively required employers to post remedial Board-supplied notices
in adjudication when certain types of unfair labor practices were found. 253
Judge Henderson’s concurrence to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion went on to
criticize the Board’s basis for claiming that the posting rule was
‘‘necessary’’ under Section 6, stating that even if its ‘‘speculative
assertions have some factual basis,’’ the NLRA does not require
employers to fill the ‘‘knowledge gap’’: ‘‘Unions and the NLRB are at
least as qualified to disseminate appropriate information-----easily and
cheaply in this information technology age-----and in fact already do so. The
NLRA-----and Section 6 in particular-----simply does not authorize the Board
to impose on an employer a freestanding obligation to educate its
employees on the fine points of labor relations law.’’254 For support, Judge
Henderson cited the lower court’s decision in the pending Fourth Circuit
case: ‘‘Here, the Board’s interpretation of Section 6 as authorizing the rule
does not incorporate any labor-related expertise.’’255 Neither court
assessed the Board’s analysis of the costs and benefits of mandating
employers to post the Government-issued poster nor did the Fourth
Circuit, which based its decision on the Board’s violation of the APA,
engage in cost-benefit analysis itself. 256
252
253
254
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Thus, when the rule was challenged by the National Association of
Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, respectively, the thin
social scientific basis for the rule was on full display even though the
Board had no statutory authority to hire researchers to perform economic
analysis, only receives data from the parties before it, and thus could
never engage in broad prophylactic rulemaking based on its own empirical
evidence. The tragedy is that this is not for lack of independent scholarly
and empirical research on workers’ lack of knowledge of their statutory
rights, labor and information economics research on the role of
information asymmetries in employment that result in discriminatory and
other conduct that could rise to the level of unfair labor practices, and
more. 257 The Board’s weak support for the rule was therefore likely
avoidable even without a new DER because of existing research, but
without the internal capacity to solicit, cull and analyze it, and without its
own independent research on the specific question of the absence of
employee knowledge of NLRA rights as well as why the chosen
enforcement mechanisms would be beneficial, the Board suffered.
Second, demonstrating the institutional effects of the Board falling into
‘‘administrative law exile’’ through its dereliction of rulemaking, the
courts’ reasoning on why the Board exceeded its authority in promulgating
the rule was discordant with current administrative law doctrine and
misinformed on significant Supreme Court precedent on judicial deference
to the Board. I’ll begin with the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. Without reaching
either the First Amendment issue or the issue of whether the Board had
authority under Section 6 to promulgate the rule, the D.C. Circuit held
violation of the APA).
257
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that the rule violated Section 8(c) of the NLRA, which provides that
‘‘[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’’258 The court reasoned that,
because Section 8(c) precluded the Board from finding non-coercive
employer speech to be an unfair labor practice, or evidence of an unfair
labor practice, and because the Board notice was non-coercive speech it
was requiring employers to disseminate, the posting requirement
contravened Section 8(c). 259 Yet, the court neither addressed arguments for
why, assuming the Board had authority to promulgate the rule, it should
not defer to the Board’s interpretation of why it did not violate Section
8(c), and it waffled between its analysis of Section 8(c) and its First
Amendment analysis, interpreting the requirements of Section 8(c)
exclusively under First Amendment law. 260 In explicitly declining to reach
the First Amendment issue, however, the court failed to cite constitutional
avoidance as its entitlement to trump Chevron deference and engage in its
own analysis of why its interpretation of Section 8(c) was reasonable,
eliding significant NLRB precedent in DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council261 and the Chevron framework
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deception. Id. at 20. The court explicitly overturned its prior National Manufacturers
Association precedent, another disclosure requirement case, to the extent that case relied
on a narrow interpretation of First Amendment doctrine that would have only sustained
government-compelled disclosure requirements where the government could show an
interest in correcting deception. Id. at 23.
261
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding that ‘‘where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress’’); see also Charlotte Garden, Constitutional Avoidance and Labor
Law, ___ (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
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altogether. 262 Even if the court had cited the proper administrative law
precedent, its interpretation of Section 8(c) ignored important Supreme
Court precedent on how to address Board action that might encroach on
First Amendment speech. 263 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing, the Court held
that:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer
expression must be made in the context of its labor relations
setting. Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the
equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as those
rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(1) and
the proviso at § 8(c). And any balancing of those rights
must take into account the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers. . . . 264
The court’s flagrant failure to abide by Supreme Court precedent here is
not only a legal error but is also indicative of a decades-long process by
which, since the 1940 lapse of the DER, NLRA jurisprudence has both
lacked evidence of and failed to integrate evidence of ‘‘economic
dependence’’ in its balancing of employers and employees’ rights.
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is no less indicative of how judicial
review of NLRB rulemaking deviates from mainstream administrative law
doctrine. It held that the Board lacked rulemaking authority under Section
6 to promulgate the rule because the text, structure and history of the
NLRA, as well as the history of evolving regulation, confirmed that
authority to be purely ‘‘reactive . . . in addressing unfair labor practice
charges and conducting representation elections upon request.’’265 But
despite Supreme Court precedent that has emphasized the Board’s broad
rulemaking authority-----holding that the Board ‘‘has the primary
responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy’’ and
‘‘necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of
the broad statutory provisions’’266-----and despite not making a finding as to
262

Morris, Notice-Posting, supra note 245, at 1395.
Id. at 1396-97.
264
395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
265
Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 154.
266
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. , 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) (quoting
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978)); see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n,
499 U.S. at 613 (‘‘As a matter of statutory drafting, if Congress had intended to curtail in
a particular area the broad rulemaking authority granted in § 6, we would have expected
it to do so in language expressly describing an exception from that section or at least
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whether the NLRA is silent or ambiguous as to the specific question of
notice posting, the court defies overwhelming authority on the APA to
find it need not proceed to Chevron step two: whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 267
To move past this series of errors and misjudgments on the part of
both the Board and the courts, it is critical to bring the NLRB out of exile,
focusing first on how to improve the rulemaking process through
integrating economic and social scientific analysis. Like other agency
rulemakings mandating disclosure requirements, the Board could have
been prepared for judicial review by conducting a voluntary cost-benefit
analysis following the requirements of Circular A-4: stating the need for
regulatory action, defining the baseline but for the action, identifying
regulatory alternatives and their consequences, quantifying and monetizing
benefits and costs, evaluating non-quantified and non-monetized costs and
benefits, and, in presenting its overall analysis, characterizing uncertainty.
A new DER would be perfectly placed to conduct and supervise this
analysis, beginning with investigating the existence and extent of any
market failure created by information asymmetries resulting from
workers’ lack of knowledge of their NLRA rights. The DER could begin
by reviewing and evaluating existing empirical data beyond the three law
review articles it cited268 and could conduct its own field studies along the
lines of those conducted by the CFPB’s Research Division. 269 The
Division could also compare the likelihood that employees file unfair labor
practice charges or petitions for representation elections when they have
been notified of their NLRA rights as opposed to when they have not, and
given the large number of natural experiments available where federal
labor statutes have required notice posting (the FLSA, Title VII, OSHA,
and so on), could evaluate rates of compliance as well as whether they
increased employees’ exercise of federal rights. In evaluating compliance
in other labor settings, the Division could establish a basis for determining
whether notice posting has an impact on employer’s violations of federal
employment law. That determination could serve as a basis for justifying a
correlation between notice posting and employer commission of unfair
referring specifically to the section. ’’).
267
Id. at 159-60. See also Morris, Notice-Posting, supra note 245, at 1391-92.
268
See supra note 257.
269
See, e.g., CFPB, TOOLS FOR SAVING: USING PREPAID ACCOUNTS TO SET ASIDE
F UNDS
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.consumerfincance.gov/data-research/researchreports/tools-saving-using-prepaid-accounts-set-aside-funds/ (presenting results of large
field study exploring consumers’ use of ‘‘set aside’’ feature on American Express prepaid
card).
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labor practices such that the disclosure requirement would be ‘‘necessary
for carrying out’’ Section 8(a)(1), the provision of the NLRA that makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer ‘‘to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed’’ under Section
7. 270 Such data would also aid in determining whether mandating notice
would be ‘‘necessary for carrying out’’ the policy of the Act as stated in
Section 1 of ‘‘restoring equality in bargaining power between employers
and employees’’ by making sure both parties have the information
necessary to negotiate from equal positions. Next, the DER could evaluate
a range of enforcement mechanisms by studying their relative costs and
benefits, including the non-quantified and non-monetized costs and
benefits of burdening employers’ speech. Finally, the DER could weigh
the costs and benefits of a proposed notice-posting rule. The Board in fact
conducted a limited cost-benefit analysis of the impact of the rule on small
businesses as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and determined
that ‘‘the economic impact of its notice-posting rule on small employers is
not significant.’’271 Specifically, it calculated the average compliance cost
in the first year for all employers subject to the NLRA to be $64.40,
finding it ‘‘unlikely in the extreme that this minimal cost would lead to
either the short- or long-term insolvency of any business entity, or place
small employers at a competitive disadvantage.’’272 But the social benefits
were found to ‘‘far outweigh the minimal costs to employers of posting
notices informing employees of th[eir] rights.’’273 With a new Division, the
Board’s analysis would be much more robustly supported by social
scientific data on the relationship between knowledge of NLRA and their
successful exercise, and, further, the economic impact on workers who
successfully exercise their rights under the NLRA. 274
V. MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION
A new DER could also be charged with assessing the macroeconomic
effects of its current and future regulation as well as failure to regulate.
This Section highlights areas of focus for researching and assessing such
270
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76 Fed. Reg. at 54,043.
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macroeconomic affects and proposes best practices for integrating
macroeconomic analysis into labor regulation. It ends with an example of
assessing how employees are classified as ‘‘independent contractors’’ as
opposed to ‘‘employees’’ under the labor law to illustrate how
macroeconomic modeling could improve the Board’s regulation.
A. Macroeconomic Effects of Labor Regulation
Another purpose of the NLRA was to increase workers’ mass
purchasing power for macroeconomic stabilization and growth. 275 The
Act’s Preamble states that ‘‘the inequality of bargaining power between
employees . . . and employers . . . substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry.’’276 The Act was intended to work as a corrective. 277
This purpose is all the more important now in light of labor’s declining
share of national income and almost unprecedented inequality. 278 Labor’s
share of national income has dropped from a high of 51.5 percent in 1970
to an estimated 42.9 percent in 2015. 279 The share of corporate-sector
275

See 79 Cong. Rec. 7565, 7567-68, 7572 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (‘‘2 LEGIS. HIST.’’), at 2318, 2326, 2330, 2339-40 (1985);
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379,
1418-19 (1993).
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29 U.S.C. § 151.
277
Id.
278
For the decline of labor’s share of national income, see BLS, Estimating the U.S.
Labor
Share,
MONTHLY
LABOR
REVIEW
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/
article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm.
For
discussions of inequality in the U.S., see ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT
CAN BE DONE? 133-54 (2015) (discussing relationship between inequality and the
bargaining power of workers and labor unions); PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 23-24, 294-96,
314-15 (2014). For the effect of union density on inequality, see IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE
LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933 63-70, 84-90 (1969)
(discussing decline of union density and rise in inequality between 1920 and 1930 even as
productivity increased); Jake Rosenfeld, Patrick Denice & Jennifer Laird, Union Decline
Lowers Wages of Nonunion Workers 1-3 (EPI, Briefing Paper No. 112811, Aug. 30,
2016), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/112811.pdf (finding that private-sector union decline
since late 1970s contributed to wage losses among nonunion workers); Martin A. Asher
& Robert H. DeFina, The Impact of Changing Union Density on Earnings Inequality, 18
J. LAB. RES. 425, 426 (1997) (same).
279
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Shares of Gross Domestic Income:
Compensation of Employees, Paid: Wage and Salary Accruals: Disbursements: To
Persons, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W270RE1A156NBEA (last visited July 28,
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income going to labor compensation rather than corporate profits since
2000 is at historic lows. 280 Over the last decade alone, there has been a
shift amounting to $750 billion from labor to capital, and industries with
larger increases in market concentration exhibit a larger decline in labor’s
share. 281 The broader shift from wages to profits increases inequality, but
much of the increase in inequality has occurred within labor’s share,
between compensation to high earners relative to low earners. 282 In his
seminal account of the rise of income inequality, Thomas Piketty explains
the 45-50 percent increase in the top decile’s share of U.S. national
income as resulting from ‘‘a veritable separation of the top managers of
large firms from the rest of the population,’’ those who have high
bargaining power to set their own remuneration and those who do not. 283
In addition to these restructurings, declining union density has removed a
critical countermechanism of achieving more equitable wealth distribution
through asserting real bargaining leverage against employers. 284 Declining
unionization is estimated to account for between a fifth and a third of the
increase in inequality since the 1970s. 285 This adverse macroeconomic
distribution can result in underconsumption, persistent unemployment and
deflation. 286 The impact of institutional factors like labor market
institutions, the bargaining power of workers, union density, minimum
wage laws, unemployment benefits and coverage, and severance pay are
all variables that impact the labor income share. 287
2017).
280
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284
TITO BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS
63-94 (2008).
285
MISHEL ET AL., supra note 282, at 6-8; CEA, Labor Market Monopsony, supra
note 281, at 10-12; Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in
U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514-37 (2011).
286
See Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power, 10 J. LAB. RES.
285, 291-92 (1989).
287
International Labour Organization, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR REGULATION

65

Measuring the impact of NLRB regulation on workers’ diminished
share of the pie can thus be a crucial means for servicing the needs of
macroeconomic policy. 288 Little scholarly attention has been placed on the
potential use of macroeconomic modeling to forecast how new regulation,
or regulatory changes, can impact labor’s share of income. While
economists have honed methods for determining labor’s share, 289 the labor
law literature has yet to integrate their utility for regulatory choices in the
administrative state.
Additionally, countercyclical regulation and the use of cost-benefit
analysis to consider the macroeconomic effects of regulation on
employment (and unemployment) have recently become critical topics of
scholarly interest. 290 But the specific effects of unions’ output-enhancing
role on macroeconomic stability has been less integrated into the law and
economics scholarship, even as it has been a sustained subject of scholarly
interest in labor economics. 291 Where unions in fact enhance output----through, for example, effectively promoting efficiencies through lower
worker turnover, building trust between workers and managers, enforcing
fair work rules through grievance procedures, giving voice to workers’
collective concerns that each worker has inadequate incentive to raise on
Development, The Labour Share in G20 Economies 9-10 (OECD Report, 2015),
https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-Share-inG20-Economies.pdf; Samuel Bentolila and Giles Saint-Paul, Explaining Movements in the
Labor Share, 1 B.E. J. OF MACROECON. 1-33 (2003).
288
Hafiz, supra note 72, at ___.
289
See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Measuring Labor’s Share, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 45,
45-51 (1999).
290
See, e.g., Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461, 1464-66 (2016) (proposing countercyclical bankruptcy law rules to preserve
jobs through reorganization); Listokin, supra note 181, at 8-10 & nn. 17-29
(summarizing literature on law and macroeconomics); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A.
Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579, 583
(2012) (arguing that agencies ‘‘should collect information about the nature of job loss
caused by proposed regulations, better estimate these layoffs, and incorporate
unemployment costs in cost-benefit analyses of major regulations’’); David M. Driesen,
Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection, B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 35-38, 51 (2005) (advocating for feasibility analysis of regulation that
takes into account their employment effects); Kelman, supra note 181, at 1227-46.
291
With key exceptions being Kelman, supra note 181, at 1273-77; Thomas J.
Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1012-22 (1986); Douglas
Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 354-60 (1984). For labor
economics literature on unions’ output-enhancing role, see, e.g. F REEMAN & MEDOFF,
supra note 216; Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance, in
WHAT DO UNIONS DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 193-237 (James T. Bennett &
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their own, and overcoming free-rider problems bargaining for public
goods (seniority, health and safety protocols, health insurance, pension
plans and so on)-----labor regulation should consider the macroeconomic
impacts of promoting as opposed to weakening union density.
This is not to say that such macroeconomic modeling will be easy, or
that the macroeconomic effects specifically on labor’s share of national
income or union’s output-enhancing role should trump all other
macroeconomic goals in policy-making. 292 My narrow argument is that the
baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater: collecting data and
modeling the macroeconomic effects of labor regulation on the strength of
labor institutions as well as existing inequality provides a critical piece to
the macroeconomic policy-making puzzle that can serve broader economic
policy goals, and the more we know about that piece, the better. And as
the following section discusses more fully, administrative agencies have
developed best practices in macroeconomic modeling that offer hope that
doing the same in the labor context can provide critical data points for
better Board regulation.
B. Towards Integrating Macroeconomic Analysis into Labor Regulation
A new DER could be charged with researching and investigating how
the NLRB’s rules impact labor’s share of national income and
circumstances where unions have an output-enhancing role on
macroeconomic stability. Beyond the agencies with clear mandates to
conduct macroeconomic analyses (the Federal Reserve; the Treasury,
Labor and Commerce Departments; the OMB; and the Congressional
Budget Office), the question of whether administrative agencies should
engage in macroeconomic analysis has been controversial. 293 However, the
NCEE’s considerable contributions to the economic analysis of
environmental regulation and EPA Guidelines were not only recommended
to the SEC by the author of Business Roundtable, but could serve as a
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model in the labor setting. 294 The NCEE employs ‘‘dozens of economists’’
within the Office of Policy at the EPA, and has been labeled as a ‘‘miniOMB’’ within that agency for its economic analysis of the EPA’s
regulatory impacts. 295 It provides analytical advice to the EPA’s other
divisions, disseminates guidance on cost-benefit analysis across the
agency, and funds outside projects. 296 Moreover, it produces and delegates
to external researchers and scholars a wealth of research reports, over 660
between 1971 and 2011 alone. 297 As discussed supra, 298 the regulatory
capacity and infrastructure that the EPA has developed in nearly forty
years of cost-benefit analyses supports its pioneering use of CGE and
other macroeconomic modeling methods to forecast the economy-wide
impacts of environmental policy changes.
A new DER could not only develop original research projects and
investigations but also marshal the considerable amount of scholarship and
ongoing
research
to
mobilize
social-scientifically
grounded
macroeconomic analyses of the Board’s regulation.
First, in researching and assessing how the Board’s rules impact
labor’s share of national income, the DER could identify key areas of the
Board’s regulation for further study. For example, it could assess how the
Board’s jurisdiction over certain workers over others impacts labor’s
share. For example, as discussed more fully below, the DER could assess
how NLRA jurisprudential line-drawing as between who constitutes an
‘‘employee,’’ and is thus protected under the Act, and who constitutes an
‘‘independent contractor,’’ and is thus exempt from its protections, has
impacted relative wages and non-wage benefits of workers in the same
labor market at the same firm or in the same industry. 299 It could then
provide illuminating study of how different line-drawing-----for example,
including ‘‘independent contractors’’ that perform identical work at a firm
as a majority of permanent employees within the definition of
‘‘employee’’-----could impact the labor share, assuming they were to
exercise their right to organize and establish a union or join an existing
294
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one. The DER could also compare the impact of denying immigrant
workers the NLRA’s remedies of back pay and/or reinstatement after
Hoffman Plastics impacts not only immigrants’ labor share of income, but
also labor’s share more generally to the extent there is a shirking or noncompliance effect on non-immigrant workers. 300 More broadly, the DER
could examine not only which rules better facilitate unionization (shorter
periods between filing petitions for representation elections and elections
themselves, stronger remedies for NLRA violations, and so on), but also
when putting the thumb on the scales in favor of those rules enhances
labor’s share.
The ability of Board regulation to lift labor’s declining share of
national income can also be the subject of DER study. Unions serve
critical roles in: (1) ex ante bargaining over the amount of surplus
unionized workers will capture; and (2) challenging employer rent-seeking
by discharging workers through opportunistic breaches
of long-term compensation contracts in which the employer
is obliged to pay the long-term worker sums above current
in-plant marginal product (or at least closer to in-plant
product than market wages) in exchange for the worker
having accepted lower payments in the past. 301
Employers benefit from establishing long-term internal labor market
(ILM) pay structures as a means of capturing the complexity of labor as a
dynamic input of production: fixed compensation structures allow
employers to recover recruitment and training costs by incentivizing
longer-term attachments through higher wage premiums and turnover
reduction. 302 ILMs are also a means by which firms overcome holdup
problems, reduce monitoring costs, and prevent either workers or
employers from cheating the other in the face of incomplete employment
contracts. 303 Without regulation, employers can breach by engaging in
300
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wage discrimination, opting out of unionized wages by hiring workers in
the external labor market subject only to the constraint of enforcement of
existing collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) or strike threats. CBA
enforcement has limited impact where employers have cleverly
circumvented the union’s jurisdiction through hiring decisions and where
unions lack bargaining power to either effectively introduce or implement
subcontracting clauses. 304 And a strike may decrease both employers and
employees’ welfare by disrupting firm output. Thus, in circumstances
where enforcement is ‘‘distributively justified,’’305 and contributes to the
social stability of implicit or even explicit contracting to prevent employer
rent-seeking and encourage increased output, rules facilitating the ease of
CBA enforcement could have macroeconomic benefits.
A crucial question emerges, however, when concerted activity ‘‘is a
costlier tool for workers to use than controlling the firm’s capacity to
adjust to shifting demand conditions (whether by hiring new workers in a
boom, lowering wages in a slump, or laying off workers who will not
accept lower wages).’’306 A new DER will need to balance the labor law’s
distributive goal-----to increase workers’ share of the pie-----with its
microeconomic goal of ensuring competitive wage rates, or not
‘‘permit[ting] workers to create rents by restricting supply, in ways that
significantly redistribute from potential incumbent workers (rather than
from employers to workers) and create unemployment.’’307 In
‘‘imagin[ing] techniques to increase workers’ bargaining power that do not
simultaneously involve rent creation,’’308 the DER could consider altering
the balance of permissible and impermissible primary and secondary
activity. Depending on labor market conditions, primary activity, or
employee strikes aimed at a direct employer to restrict that employer’s
labor supply, could adversely impact non-unionized worker wages and the
overall labor share where secondary activity, or employee strikes aimed at
364-73 (1993) (discussing evolution and value of ILMs to employers and employees);
Paul R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization
Design, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42-60 (1988); Oliver Williamson, Jeffrey Harris & Michael
Wachter, Understanding the Employment Relation --- The Analysis of Idiosyncratic
Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975) (linking development of ILMs to employers’ need
to develop self-enforcing performance incentives).
304
See BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE
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union-avoidance strategies such as outsourcing, plant closures, and bankruptcy filings).
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other employers or employees with whom the employer deals or
competes, could serve to incorporate and uplift non-unionized workers’
wages and non-wage benefits, thus increasing labor’s overall share of
income. Such secondary activity is currently prohibited, but the DER
could examine ways of adjusting the prohibition-----say, by expanding the
definition of ‘‘primaries’’ to include ‘‘transactional primaries’’ with market
power over direct employers’ product or labor input markets-----so as to
adjust existing regulation towards better macroeconomic benefits. 309
Finally, the DER could research conditions under which unions have
an output-enhancing role on a firm- or industry-wide basis. For example,
it could investigate and compare unionized output with non-unionized
output in industries on the firm level as well as whether Board rules
imposed on unionized or unionizing workplaces have impacted output,
pre- and post-rule. It could examine whether more rather than less
inclusive bargaining units enhance output, or whether making a subject of
bargaining mandatory or permissive enhances or decreases output.
C. Case Study: The Independent Contractor Exemption
One of the most widely and prominently debated issues in current
labor law is the issue of ‘‘independent contractor’’ misclassification:
whether employers are misclassifying their ‘‘employees’’ as ‘‘independent
contractors’’ to avoid employer liability under federal and state labor and
employment law. 310 The shift away from direct employment to
independent contracting in the New Economy has meant a pervasive
restructuring in the employment relationship, from the rise of Uber and
Lyft drivers to repurposed ‘‘independent’’ cable installers to heavy-duty
truckers. 311 Workers’ ability to seek statutory protections rests on
precarious and inconsistently applied line-drawing conducted by the
Board, and with little deference thereto, the courts, in determining how
far to extend common law agency doctrine. What the line-drawing has
unfortunately ignored is virtually any and all economic analysis, as the
following study of the leading case on the issue, FedEx Home Delivery v.
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NLRB, demonstrates. 312 However, this Sub-Section focuses on a narrower
question: how the DER could research and provide guidance on how the
line-drawing exercises performed by the Board and the courts have
macroeconomic impacts to better inform regulating bodies and the
judiciary of the broader economic implications of their decisions.
The core question before the D.C. Circuit in FedEx was whether
FedEx’s refusal to bargain with a union certified by FedEx drivers was an
unfair labor practice because the drivers were ‘‘employees’’ and not
‘‘independent contractors’’ exempt from the protections of the Act. 313 In a
controversial ruling that the drivers were ‘‘independent contractors,’’ the
court crafted a new test adapted from common law agency doctrine. 314
While the court still claimed to rely on traditional agency law principles,
the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s non-exhaustive ten-factor test, and
the D.C. Circuit’s case law precedent, it dramatically departed from its
decades-long reliance on a ‘‘right-to-control test’’ in favor of an
‘‘entrepreneurial test.’’315 Specifically, the court stated that while the new
test retained ‘‘all of the common law factors,’’ it shifted ‘‘emphasis’’ away
from ‘‘the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a more accurate proxy:
whether the ‘putative independent contractors have significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’’’316 The court then proceeded
to consider such ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ opportunity for the FedEx drivers and
found that ‘‘the indicia favoring a finding that the contractors are
employees are clearly outweighed by evidence of entrepreneurial
opportunity,’’ and so much so that it need not grant deference to the
Board: ‘‘the Board cannot be said to have made a choice between two
fairly conflicting views.’’317
Since the outcome significantly turned on this ‘‘evidence,’’ and
because its deficiency is a useful example of how important it is that the
Board be granted resources to collect data and conduct economic analysis,
it is detailed here. First, it is crucial to point out that the Board excluded a
substantial source of data from its consideration in its decision below: it
refused to permit FedEx to introduce system-wide evidence concerning the
number of route sales and driver profits it hoped would show the drivers’
‘‘entrepreneurial interest in their position.’’318 So even though the D.C.
312
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Circuit substituted an entrepreneurial test for its almost century-long
reliance on a right-to-control test, a shift in emphasis that Judge Garland
in dissent and other circuits rejected, 319 it did so without a developed
evidentiary record of the economic realities of the drivers’ actual access to
entrepreneurial opportunity. In his dissent, Judge Garland found that the
Board’s failure to reasonably explain its exclusion of the evidence required
that the D.C. Circuit remand the case back to the Board ‘‘to give FedEx a
fair opportunity to make its case under the appropriate test.’’320
The core evidence the D.C. Circuit relied on as demonstrative of a
‘‘significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss’’ was the language
of FedEx’s Standard Agreement with drivers. 321 According to the court,
that Agreement gave drivers sufficient discretion over their contracted-for
services to warrant a finding of ‘‘independent contractor’’ status. 322
Beyond the Agreement’s terms, the court admitted it had a ‘‘limited
record.’’323 That record consisted of: one driver using the FedEx truck offhours to deliver lawn mowers for a repair company; two drivers
independently incorporating; one driver negotiating with FedEx for higher
fees; over 25 percent of drivers hiring their own employees at some point;
and at least two contractors selling their routes (the question of whether
the sales were profitable was disputed). 324
In his dissent, Judge Garland not only rejected the majority’s shift to a
focus on entrepreneurial opportunity from a multi-factor test that ‘‘requires
a broad examination of all facets of the relationship between’’ the
company and the worker, but also highlighted evidence viewed as
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underappreciated by the majority. 325 Specifically, he pointed to the
Regional Director’s findings that the drivers: perform a function that is a
regular and essential part of FedEx’s operations and must do business in
its name; must wear uniforms and badges and operate vehicles that meet
FedEx’s specifications; are trained by FedEx if they have no prior
experience; and are not permitted to use their vehicles for other purposes
while providing service to FedEx. 326 He also cited evidence of FedEx’s
substantial control over drivers’ performance of their functions: FedEx
retains the right to reconfigure the service area unilaterally and unilaterally
determines rates and compensation for all drivers; drivers must furnish a
FedEx-approved vehicle and FedEx-approved driver daily from Tuesday
through Saturday; drivers lack discretion to provide delivery services on a
given day; FedEx controls their work schedule by requiring all packages
be delivered on the day of assignment, and terminal managers determine
how many deliveries they will make each day; and FedEx supports drivers
with insurance and a Business Support Package, arranges substitute
drivers, helps in defraying repair costs, and pays certain vehicle-related
taxes and fees. 327 Finally, he cited the weak evidence outside the
Agreement of drivers actually exercising their entrepreneurial
opportunities as supporting a finding of ‘‘employee’’ status, citing
precedent that ‘‘if a company offers its workers entrepreneurial
opportunities that they cannot realistically take, then that does not add any
weight to the [c]ompany’s claim that the workers are independent
contractors.’’328
Neither the majority nor the dissent anchored their reasoning in
economic analyses of how market structures or the terms of the
contractual agreement create entrepreneurial risks and opportunities. In
fact, while the majority and dissent starkly differed on whether the focus
of the agency test should be on entrepreneurial opportunity as opposed to
control, an economist would see them as two sides of the same coin:
which party gets to fill the gaps of the incomplete employment contract?329
And in seeking evidence to answer the question, he or she would look to
the contract’s compensation structures, residual rights, information
325
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asymmetries between the parties, the parties’ sunk costs, mobility costs,
opportunity costs, market power, market conditions, and so on, not
uniforms. To robustly determine entrepreneurial opportunity, the Board
and the court would have needed to, but failed to even consider: the
respective termination rights of the parties, contractual penalties, the scope
and magnitude of contractual assignment of risks, how the contract
restricts drivers’ opportunity costs by mandating delivery days and how
many deliveries must occur each day, and most significantly, actual
empirical data.
Gathering and analyzing such data could be a critical function of the
new DER. In a world of the ‘‘new psychological contract,’’ where
employees generally no longer assume that the employment contract offers
job security and promotional opportunity at a single employer ‘‘but rather
assume that it offers job opportunities with other employers and
marketability in the external labor market,’’ social scientific evidence will
be all the more crucial for non-arbitrary line-drawing. 330
But the Board should not limit itself to ad hoc line-drawing by
adjudication. Instead, a new DER would have the opportunity to develop
and hone economy-wide modeling on how more or less inclusive linedrawing around characteristics and employment arrangements deemed
dispositive of ‘‘employee’’ or ‘‘independent contractor’’ status have
broader impacts on labor’s share of income, just like the EPA has utilized
economy-wide modeling to determine the impacts of environmental
regulation on the national economy. As of now, the Board lacks any
ability to assess how many workers are denied the right to organize and
bargain collectively because they are classified as ‘‘independent
contractors.’’ Like DERA, the Board should be able to deploy its own
‘‘econometric abilities to ascertain for itself the economic reality of [labor]
markets before it seeks to regulate them,’’ an ability that is particularly
salient because the Board is much less likely to get such broad data from
parties that it is not jurisdictionally permitted to regulate. 331 Such data
collection and analysis could identify a pool of candidates misclassified as
‘‘independent contractors,’’ identify their average compensation and
frequency of participation in the labor market, model union wage or
internal labor market wage rates through reviewing wage rates in the same
For the ‘‘new psychological contract,’’ see Katherine V.W. Stone, The New
Psychological Contract, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 552 (2001); Denise M. Rousseau &
Snehal A. Tijoriwala, Assessing Psychological Contracts, 19 J. ORG. BEHAV. 679, 683
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or similar labor markets or through historical data, and assess the impacts
on labor’s share of income if more or less of the pool had wage rates
determined by internal rather than external labor markets. It could then
perform and offer a cost-benefit analysis of certain ‘‘independent
contractor’’ definitions over others for a future definitional Board
rulemaking that incorporates not only consideration of substantial data on
independent contractors, but also the widespread effects of its choice of
one definition over other regulatory alternatives.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a revival of the NLRB’s Division of Economic
Research to not only ground and refine the Board’s policy-making
adjudication, but also to set broader parameters for the Board’s
consideration of the micro- and macroeconomic effects of its regulation
and failure to regulate. But it also encourages a broader engagement by
the regulatory state with collaborative opportunities to hone enforcement
and policy-making by propelling economic and social scientific analysis of
work and worker’s collective rights. For decades, an administrative law
revolution has embraced the use of economic and social scientific analysis
and is consistently raising the bar for agency expertise in regulatory
policy. Labor regulation, and the prominence of the institutions devising
and implementing it, has been left behind, harming not only the workers
that the law is intended to protect, but also the legitimacy and influence of
pro-worker regulation more generally.
Drawing on lessons from both the original Division of Economic
Research and best practices from agency integration of the work of
economists and social scientists in the administrative state, this Article
presents a blueprint for how the NLRB could begin reclaiming a central
role in regulatory debates. And it is not a moment too soon: rising
inequality, eroding union density, increasing market concentration, and a
lagging social safety net present significant challenges to the legacy of the
New Deal. It is time that that legacy be invigorated and modernized to
meet the demands of the New Economy workplace.
***

